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This dissertation consists of three self-contained essays and covers both theoretical
and empirical topics related to the behavior and performance of firms participating in
international trade in a large emerging economy, i.e., China. It aims to resolve two
themes: how a country’s export promotion policies affect firms’ productivity and its
welfare, and how firms adjust their export behavior to changes in trade policies. These
questions are essential because firms do not operate in a vacuum and trade policies
evolve. I begin with a theoretical model of how the interaction between trade barriers
and the large scale of processing trade1 shapes the export patterns of Chinese firms in
Chapter 1. I then discuss the evidence on the effects of trade policy changes on the ex-
port behavior of Chinese firms in Chapters 2 and 3. The first essay extends the Melitz
(2003) heterogeneous-firm model. Chapter 2 exploits the US antidumping measures
against China as an exogenous shock to firms and uses a difference-in-difference strat-
egy, whereas Chapter 3 uses alternative dependent variables to broaden the results. In
what follows, I outline the results and highlight the contributions of the three essays
respectively.
The first essay focuses on firms that solely export, i.e., processing exporters in
China. One-third of Chinese firms are processing exporters, which almost exclusively
produce for foreign countries and sell more than 70 percent of their output abroad. Nev-
ertheless, recent empirical research using the longitudinal firm-level data from China
has substantiated that processing exporters are the least productive firms (e.g. Dai
et al., 2016; Lu, 2010). Some of these studies have further shown that processing ex-
porters earn lower profits, pay less wages, are relatively smaller in terms of sales, have
lower capital intensity, and are less skill intensive (e.g. Fernandes and Tang, 2015).
These factors run counter to the accumulated knowledge about exporting firms in de-
1Processing trade refers to the activity of assembling tariff exempted imported inputs into final
goods for resale in the foreign markets (Dai et al., 2016).
1
veloped countries: exporters tend to be larger, pay higher wages and be associated
with superior productivity relative to their non-exporting counterparts.
In order to reconcile these contrasting findings, I propose an extension of Melitz
(2003) two-country general equilibrium model which distinguishes between processing
exporters, non-exporters, and regular exporters. I also introduce fixed domestic trade
costs, which capture the salient feature of Chinese domestic market is segmented by
provincial borders and access to other regional markets requires fixed entry costs.2 The
model shows that the presence of domestic trade costs alongside the processing trade
leads firms self-selecting to become processing exporters, non-exporters, and regular
exporters. It then shows that falling trade costs deliver welfare gains in China, albeit
the impact of freer trade is unevenly distributed across different types of firms. More
importantly, the paper highlights that the reductions in domestic trade barriers have
the most pronounced effects: which expand the set of available goods to domestic
(Chinese) consumers and hence raise the aggregate welfare.
The focus of the second essay lies in how temporary increases in export costs in
one market affect firm export behavior across markets. In particular, I investigate
how Chinese exporters respond to market-specific tariff shocks that arise from US
antidumping measures both to the US and to other countries. Antidumping measures
mainly take the form of an ad-valorem tariff. While studies in this area are mostly
concentrated on the protected firms (e.g. Pierce, 2011; Konings and Vandenbussche,
2008), this paper aims to contribute to the relatively sparse literature by exploring the
effects of antidumping measures on the adjustment across products within targeted
exporters.
Using Chinese customs data between 2000 and 2006, I first assess the trade de-
struction effect at the product level. I find that antidumping measures severely distort
bilateral trade flows between China and the US. In addition, there is a significant ad-
verse effect on the extensive margin. That is, antidumping measures lead product less
likely to be exported to the US and there is a sharp decrease in the number of exporters
serving the US market. I then estimate the impact of US antidumping measures on
Chinese exports in non-US markets, which has been overlooked by literature. Surpris-
ingly, I do not find any evidence that the US imposition of such trade restrictions has
any impact on Chinese exports in alternative markets. That is, trade restriction in one
market does not affect the evolution of aggregate export in another market, where the
policy has not changed. This result hence questions the justification of the Chinese
overcapacity would undermine and distort well-established world trade patterns.
2The types of domestic trade barriers include physical barriers, outright prohibition through ad-
ministrative decree, financial benefits for firms selling local goods, local purchasing quotas, poor
infrastructure and business conditions, less efficient government(Wong, 2012; Pflüger and Russek,
2013).
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To gain a better understanding of the mechanisms driving the effects at the product
level, I sharpen my analysis by studying the adjustment channels at the firm-product-
destination level. I first document that Chinese firms that were hit with US antidump-
ing measures are less likely to export the targeted products and restrict their export
flows to the US market. More importantly, these surviving firms also decrease the
export to alternative markets but charge higer prices.
I next study whether an antidumping duty against one product within a firm influ-
ences its export decisions for other products across markets. I find that firms exposed
to the US trade restrictions reduce their export flow of other products in the US mar-
ket. That is, an increase in export costs in one market leads firms to downsize their
all their export in that market, possibly due to economies of scale. I also find that the
imposition of such measures, as an indicator of rising trade policy uncertainty, induces
firms less likely to export the unaffected products in other markets. One implica-
tion derived from this result is that antidumping measures generate deterrent effects
that spread to other products in other markets, widening our understanding about the
breadth and extent of such measures. In this regards, this paper contributes to the
literature by documenting that the within-firm changes constitute a significant chan-
nel of firms’ adjustment to antidumping shocks, which has been largely neglected by
existing literature.
In the third essay, I investigate how Chinese multi-product firms adjust their export
scale and product scope in response to US antidumping measures utilizing a difference-
in-difference design. This essay differs from the second one by focusing on the firm-
level adjustments along the extensive margin of product adding and dropping, as well
as along the intensive margin of changes in sales level and concentration among sur-
viving products. Existing literature has well documented that antidumping measures
significantly reduce export volumes from named countries, 50%-60% on average (e.g.
Prusa, 2001; Bown and Crowley, 2007; Carter and Gunning-Trant, 2010). However, it
has dedicated too little attention to the relationship between product churning with
firms and antidumping measures. This is an important omission since such measures
may lead firms to drop the targeted products and/or add other unaffected products.
This essay therefore aims to fill this gap.
Specifically, I compare the export decisions (e.g. how much to export, the number
of exported varieties, et cetera) for firms that were subject to the US anti-dumping
duties (punished firms), to firms that were investigated but did not face any duties
(investigated firms). I find that firms that were exposed to the US trade restrictions
reduce their export flows by 7.5 percent. Decomposing the firm level exports into the
extensive and intensive margins, I document that firms react to such rises in trade
costs via narrowing the portfolio of exported products (intra-firm extensive margin).
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However, there is no impact on the average sales per product within a firm, i.e., the
extensive margin dominates. I also find that multi-product firms tend to further skew
their sales toward their best-performing products.
I then evaluate how product flows, measured by the counts of varieties added and
dropped within firms, are affected by antidumping measures. I find that the punished
firms experience a more intense process of both the introduction and discontinuation
of products, relative to the investigated ones. In particular, they shed more products
than they add, emphasizing the role of “creative destruction” in firms’ adjustment to
changes in trade policies. My analysis therefore highlights the role of selection across
products within firms matters for transmission of external shocks.
Antidumping measures have become one of the most intensively used forms of trade
restrictions in recent years. Despite the growing importance, there is little understand-
ing of their effects at the micro level. My study of the impact of antidumping measures
at the firm level and at the firm-product-destination level is helpful to understand the
observed product level responses because they are combinations of the micro-economic
responses. These findings are also informative to policymakers, as they are crucial for
designing appropriate policy interventions. Understanding the mechanisms and the
channels through which these measures affect the allocation of resources within firms
constitute the first step in understanding how exporters react to such negative trade
shocks.
Overall, the dissertation analyzes different aspects of the increased participation
of Chinese firms in international market. It highlights the interdependence of today’s
integrated world economy and trade policies affecting two of the largest economies in
the world deliver repercussions for third countries.
The essays presented in this dissertation naturally leave room for further investiga-
tions. The first essay suggests that trade-induced reallocation effect which generates
aggregate productivity growth does not work effectively in China, because processing
trade is pervasive and with the presence of domestic trade barriers. It will be im-
portant for future research to measure Chinese domestic trade barriers and quantify
the responsiveness of trade flows to fixed barriers. Likewise, the second essay suggests
that the use of antidumping measure on one set of products from a given firm creates
negative spillovers to other unaffected products from the same firm. This finding opens
up exciting avenues for future research. It would be intriguing, for instance, to com-
prehend the role of global supply chain in the determining trade policies. Finally, the
last essay describes how Chinese firms adjust their product scope in response to US
antidumping measures. It would be particularly interesting to explore these patterns
more thoroughly, i.e., what types of products firms tend to add and drop. This exercise
will inform whether and how antidumping measures impact firms’ decisions on product
4
quality. Understanding the implications of antidumping measures on product quality
is essential because it enables us to comprehend to what extent the exporting firms
and thereby the exporting economy can reduce the impact of antidumping measures by
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Heterogeneity and Export Behavior
of Chinese Firms
Abstract
This paper incorporates processing exporters into an asymmetric two-country general
equilibrium model by Melitz (2003) to explain trade performance and export patterns
in China. The model shows how the presence of domestic trade costs alongside the
processing trade divide firms into processing exporters, non-exporters, and regular
exporters. It then shows that falling export costs deliver welfare gains in China, albeit
the impact of freer trade is unevenly distributed across different types of firms. More
importantly, the paper highlights the reductions in domestic trade barriers have the
most pronounced effects, which expand the set of available goods to Chinese consumers
and hence raise the aggregate welfare.
2.1 Introduction
The increasing integration of the Chinese manufacturing into the world economy has
led China’s extraordinary trade performance over the last three decades. This spec-
tacular achievement is mainly attributable to the international processing: the activity
of assembling tariff-exempted imported inputs into final goods for resale in the foreign
markets (Dai et al., 2016). As a means of export promotion, processing trade has been
implemented in China for over thirty years and has successfully boosted its export.
It accounts for nearly half of China’s exports and 40 percent of imports in the 2000s.
Additionally, the sheer magnitude of processing trade in China has generated a vast
number of firms that almost exclusively produce for foreign countries. I refer to these
firms as processing exporters. Defever and Riaño (2017) report that more than a third
of Chinese exporters sold 70 percent or more of their output abroad between 2000
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and 2006.1 Processing trade is also gaining popularity in other developing countries.
In 2006, processing enterprises from 130 countries employed an estimated 66 million
people, accounting for the majority of exports from countries like China, Mexico, Viet-
nam, and recently sub-Saharan African nations (International Labor Organization).
Motivated by past success, the Chinese government still considers processing trade as
a fast and efficient path to industrialization and has used various export policies to
encourage it to date.
Despite the importance of processing trade for China, research toward processing
exporters is scant. Previous studies have accumulated a rich stock of knowledge about
exporters in developed countries: they tend to be larger, pay higher wages, sell more
in the domestic market and are associated with superior productivity than their non-
exporting counterparts (e.g. Bernard and Jensen 1999; Aw et al. 2003; Bernard et al.
2003). However, recent empirical research using the longitudinal firm-level data from
China has substantiated that processing exporters are the least productive firms (e.g.
Lu 2010; Dai et al. 2016). Other studies have highlighted that processing exporters are
concentrated in labor-intensive sectors and are mainly invested by Foreign-invested En-
terprises (FIEs) (e.g. Fu 2011; Lemoine 2010; Fernandes and Tang 2015). The presence
of processing exporters distinguishes China from the developed countries. There are no
so-called processing exporters in the US or France. The goal of this paper is therefore
to incorporate the relevance of processing exporters into the heterogeneous-firm model
to strengthen its explanatory power for China that relies heavily on processing trade.
To do so, I propose an extension of Melitz (2003) general equilibrium model into an
asymmetric two-country setting. Heterogeneous Chinese firms may choose to operate
in either processing trade or regular production regimes, based on their idiosyncratic
productivity. However, firms in the foreign country (e.g. the US) can only pursue reg-
ular production mode. This asymmetric assumption matches the fact that processing
trade is only implemented in China. I also introduce fixed domestic trade costs, which
could induce firms to export but not to serve the domestic market. These two assump-
tions capture the salient features of processing trade in China. To operate in processing
trade, firms must fully withdraw from the domestic market and sell all of their output
in the foreign markets. In other words, processing exporters are not allowed to ac-
cess the domestic market, and hence there are no domestic trade costs associated with
them. Furthermore, because processing exporters passively receive orders from foreign
buyers, and therefore they have negligible fixed export costs.
The model shows that the presence of domestic trade costs along with the pro-
cessing trade leads firms self-selecting to become processing exporters, non-exporters,
1Gao and Tvede (2017) also find that the average share of processing exporters out of all exporters
in China is 27 percent.
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and regular exporters. In particular, regular exporters with both domestic and foreign
markets have the highest productivity, followed by non-exporters, and finally by pro-
cessing exporters. This model also shows that a reduction in fixed export costs induces
better-performing regular exporters to benefit from globalization through expanding
market; while worse-performing non-exporters suffer from globalization through con-
tracting market. The least productive processing exporters are forced to exit, and there
is a revenue loss for the surviving ones. Overall, each of these responses reallocates
resources toward more productive firms and hence generates improvement in aggregate
productivity levels.
Trade liberalization in variable trade costs delivers similar effects to the falling ex-
port costs. High-productive regular exporters experience the increased revenue through
greater foreign sales. The most efficient non-exporters are able to overcome the costs
of entering the foreign market, and thereby induce the entry of new regular exporters
into the export market. Moreover, the falling variable trade costs generate the entry of
new firms engaging in processing trade and hence promote processing trade activities
in China.
The analysis related to fixed domestic trade barriers shows that productivity con-
strained firms, and presumably the segmented domestic market as a whole, lead firms
to get stuck in low value-added stages of supply chain and are unable to pursue more
profitable opportunities. Integrating the Chinese domestic market might be thus an
important prerequisite for firms moving into higher value-added, more profitable ac-
tivities. Moreover, reducing the domestic trade protectionism would expand the total
varieties for consumption, and thus increase aggregate welfare. That is, the most pro-
ductive processing exporters would find it profitable to enter the domestic market as
domestic trade costs fall, and thereby create the entry of new firms into the domes-
tic market, which, in turn, expanding in the range of product varieties available to
Chinese consumers. Also, as low efficient processing exporters exit and high efficient
ones pursue regular production mode, the mass of firms engaging in processing trade
declines. This particularly benefits China, which could potentially reduce its heavy re-
liance on processing trade for growth. As pointed by Wong (2012), the domestic trade
is almost as twice as large as international trade in the Chinese economy; it could over-
take international trade as a more important driver of China’s growth if the decline in
domestic barriers were to accelerate. Therefore, a unified national market could boost
the domestic demand and keep the Chinese economy expanding while overseas markets
remain weak.
The model can also be used to evaluate the welfare consequences of increased ex-
posure to trade in the presence of large scale of processing trade. Trade liberalization
and domestic market integration lead to welfare gains. However, the welfare improve-
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ment generated by a reduction in variable trade costs is counteracted by the distortion
stemming from the expanded number of processing exporters operating in China. The
accession to WTO in 2001 triggered a sharp rise in the number of firms engaging in
processing trade, which have become the major component in China’s export and the
essential vehicle of its trade surge in the 2000s. To this end, the model is well-suited
to explain the observed empirical pattern that falling variable export costs are related
to the increasing number of processing exporters in China.
More broadly, this analysis advances to the following strands of literature. It speaks
to the emerging research on export-platform foreign direct investment (FDI), i.e., on
multinational enterprises (MNEs) that process their final goods in developing countries
(Helpman et al., 2004; Yeaple, 2009). The contribution is the model offers a better un-
derstanding of how and why firms operate at different stages along the value-added
chain. There has also been increased interest in the costs and benefits resulting from
China’s processing trade as well as to the large body of research investigating the wel-
fare implication of export processing zones and duty drawbacks (Fu, 2011; Ma et al.,
2009; Fernandes and Tang, 2015; Manova, 2012). Through the novel mechanism of
choice of trade regime, less efficient firms in labor-abundant countries are very likely
stuck in processing trade. To this line of research, the model illustrates that productiv-
ity constraint impedes firms’ export outcomes and profits. The analysis of processing
exporters is also related to the literature studying trade policy in a heterogeneous-firm
setting (Fan et al., 2013; Lu et al., 2014; Ma et al., 2014). From this point, the the-
oretical model demonstrates that the reallocation process is hindered, and thus trade
liberalization fail to generate aggregate productivity gains in industries when process-
ing trade is pervasive.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional background
on processing trade regime in China. Section 3 introduces the model and characterizes
the equilibrium with two asymmetric countries. Section 4 discusses the impact of trade
liberalization on productivity cutoffs and welfare. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Background
In the hopes of obtaining foreign technology, utilizing abundant labor force and
boosting economic growth, China has employed a wide range of trade instruments to
stimulate export activity and attract FDI since the beginning of the 1980s. An essential
intervention is the attraction of FIEs carrying out processing trade. In place since the
1980s, the provision of this policy has resulted in a far-reaching reshuffle of industrial
production at the world level. China has become a world factory and climbed to the
top of the world exporters, contributing for more than 10 percent of the global trade
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volume (the sum of exports and imports) in 2010. More importantly, processing trade
constitutes almost one-half of China’s total trade and becomes the primary contributor
to China’s trade surplus.
The prevalence of processing trade can be directly attributed to the following fac-
tors: the establishment of Free Trade Zones (FTZs)2 and the attraction of FDI. In the
1980s, the Chinese authority selected some coastal cities as Special Economic Zones
(SEZs) to stimulate trade. FIEs were strongly encouraged to locate in these zones
and to engage in processing trade. Additionally, the export-oriented firm (with the
export volume more than fifty percent) invested by foreign investors likewise granted
additional benefits such as reduced corporate income tax rate, preferential land-use
policies, easier access to finance and foreign market. In particular, enterprises located
in SEZs were free to use the vast Chinese pool of low-cost labor, which was different
from the prevailing Chinese lifetime system of public or collective firms. These policies
have proven to be highly efficient, resulting in the increase of China’s share in world
trade from 1.1 percent to 1.9 percent by the end of 1989.
Since the 1990s, the labor-intensive stage of industrial production has been relo-
cated from high-wage countries to low-wage ones, which have specialized in assembly.
To actively participate in this new form of division of labor and integrate into the global
production network, China deepened its trade reform and broadened the opening-up in
early of 1992. Policies with the similar privileges were extended to inland and western
provinces. Various economic development zones and high-tech development zones were
also established in central and western China. Moreover, China progressively lowered
foreign investors’ import duties and entry barriers. These measures have led to im-
pressive FDI flows to China and given rise to the massive investment in manufacturing
industry. FIEs accelerate the Chinese manufacturing industry into the global produc-
tion chain as they fragmented large parts of their production processes via arms-length
contracts or subsidiaries. Notably, FIEs overwhelmingly accounted for 70 percent of
processing trade in China in the first decade of the 21st century. This highlights the
essential role of foreign firms in China’s ballooning trade surplus.
The most direct and profound policy in promoting processing trade and enhancing
export is the establishment of a series of Export Processing Zones (EPZs) in the year
2000, one year before China joined the WTO. Chinese private firms, State-Owned
Enterprises (SOEs) and FIEs are all encouraged to locate in the EPZs, but all firms
are only allowed to engage in processing trade. The production inputs entering the
EPZs are duty-free, and the final assembled product for export are exempted from
2The FTZs in China include: Special Economic Zones (SEZs), Economics and Technological De-
velopment Zones (ETDZs), High-Technology Industrial Development Zones (HTIDZs), Export Pro-
cessing Zones (EPZs), Open coastal/riverside/inland/border city, Border Economic Cooperation Zone
(BECZ), Bounded Zone/Logistics Park.
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value-added tax. Furthermore, firms enjoy other preferential policies as streamlined
regulations, minimal administrative costs, and finance facilities. In other words, the
EPZs in China are very simple zones that have the highest levels of openness in the
country (Fu and Gao, 2007). However, to obtain these benefits, all firms located in the
EPZs must export 70 percent of their output. The set up of the EPZs substantially
encourages MNEs to transfer their labor-intensive stage to China. The rapid expansion
of EPZs in China has led to a great leap forward of foreign trade in China, accounting
for almost 9 percent of the world export in 2008.
In summary, the creation of processing trade regime has significantly contributed
to China’s export growth. Foreign firms are the key determinants to the expansion of
processing trade. The establishment of a large number of FTZs further consolidates
its superior export performance.
2.3 Theoretical Framework
The model extends Melitz (2003) to a world of two large asymmetric countries,
China and Foreign Country indexed by i ∈ {c, f} accordingly. Each country is popu-
lated by Li identical household. Labor is the only factor of production. Each house-
hold inelastically supplies one unit of labor and earns wage wi. I assume that China
is a labor-abundant country, having a lower wage than that of the Foreign Country
(wc < wf ). The size of the two economies is equal (Lc = Lf = L).
2.3.1 Demand
The preference of a representative consumer in country i are given by a CES utility








, i ∈ {c, f} (2.1)
where the measure of the set Ωi represents the mass of available varieties in country i.
These goods are substitutes, which implies 0 < ρ < 1 with the elasticity of substitution
between any two pair of goods having σ = 1
1−ρ > 1. Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977),
consumer behavior can be modeled by considering the set of varieties consumed as an









The assumption of CES preference indicates that the consumer has “taste for variety”
in that she/he prefers to consume a diversified bundle of goods. Moreover, even if each
variety is priced differently, adding a new one increases utility if prices of the existing
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where Ri = PiQi =
∫
ω∈Ωi ri(ω)dω is the aggregate expenditure in country i; pi(ω)
denotes the price of variety ω in the domestic market i; the price index Pi summarizes
the prices of competing varieties.
2.3.2 Production
There is a continuum of firms, each choosing to produce a different variety ω with
productivity ϕ. Production involves fixed overhead costs and variable costs in each
period. Production requires only one factor, labor, which is inelastically supplied at
its aggregate level Li, an index of the country i’s size. A firm in country i pays the
fixed market access costs fxwi to serve consumers in country j. I denote the fixed
costs of serving domestic market by fdwi, which includes “market access” costs into
the domestic market.3 Exporting involves symmetric iceberg trade costs, where τ ≥ 1
units of a good must be shipped in order for one unit to arrive. All firms in both
countries face the fixed overhead costs fwi, and vary in firm productivity, ϕ ∈ (0,∞).
In particular, a Chinese firm chooses to either pursue processing trade or regular
production mode. A processing exporter engages in processing trade which exports all
of its product by paying beachhead costs fwc. On the other hand, a regular producer
that can cover beachhead costs fwc, and domestic trade costs fdwc serves the Chinese
domestic market. Some of these regular producers that can pay the additionally fixed
export costs fxwc exporting to Foreign Country. Notably, I assume that firms in Foreign
Country only operate domestically or as regular exporters.
Processing exporters are engaged in processing trade, and it is only implemented in
China. Under this regime, the duty of the imported input is waived, and the processed
goods are not allowed to be sold in Chinese market. Processing exporters thus pay for
manufactured input and labor, and foreign buyers are responsible for the marketing
and distribution of the final goods. In other words, processing exporters only need to
bear the production costs fwc and the transportation costs τ > 1. The fixed domestic
trade costs fdwc and the fixed export costs fxwc are waived from their costs structure,
owing to the definition of processing trade. By contrast, the up-front expenditures
are highest for a regular exporter that bears all domestic trade costs fdwc, export
distribution outlays associated with production fwc, fixed export costs fxwc and the
3As stated by (Melitz and Redding, 2014), with positive domestic access costs, it can be profitable
in principle for firms to export but not to serve the domestic market.
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transportation costs τ > 1. A non-exporter that only focuses on the domestic market
has lower up-front expenses as it entails beachhead costs fwc and domestic trade costs
fdwc.
The technology of a firm is represented by a cost function which exhibits constant









where F ∈ {f, f + fd, f + fd + fx}. The profit maximization yields the standard




















where psc(ϕ) is the price charged by a Chinese processing exporter in Foreign Country;
pdc(ϕ) is the price charged by a domestic Chinese firm in its own market, and p
x
c (ϕ)
is the price charged by a regular Chinese exporter in Foreign Country. All exporting
firms face the traditional iceberg transportation costs where τ > 1 units of a good must
be shipped in order for one unit to arrive at its destination.
Substituting the pricing rule into firm revenue equation in 2.3, I obtain the following





















where rsc(ϕ) stands for the total revenue of a Chinese processing exporter gained in
Foreign Country; the equilibrium revenue of a Chinese regular producer in the domestic
market is rdc (ϕ), and in the export market is r
x
c (ϕ) .
Let k ∈ {d, x, s} index the three possible modes of production: domestic, regular
and processing export, respectively. The maximum level of profits that a Chinese firm












− (fd + fx + f)wc serves both markets
rsc(ϕ)
ϕ
− fwc only serves the Foreign Country
The departure of the model from Melitz (2003) is the additional assumption of the
domestic trade costs fd. In Melitz (2003), an integrated domestic market which involves
14
no trade costs is assumed. Owing to the costs saving advantage, less-productive firms
earn non-negative profits exclusively from the domestic market. Such an assumption
is reasonable since conducting international business is much harder than building
business relations at home in a unified market. However, Chinese domestic market
is segmented by provincial border; the productivity premium is also needed to enter
other domestic provincial markets. Naughton (2003) states that local government does
not block the border or impose any tariffs. But the government’s pervasive political
power enables it to impose significant non-tariff barriers which substantially increases
the costs of trade and impedes cross-provincial border trade.4 Therefore, generalized
the current theoretical model to capture the salient feature of high domestic trade costs
fd is very reasonable.
Foreign firms are similar to Chinese firms. The price charged by a foreign firm in





wf . The price of a product from Foreign Country





wf . Thus, the revenue earned from domestic











, where Ri and Pi denote the aggregate expenditure
and price index in country i ∈ {c, f}.. The combined revenue of a foreign firm, rf (ϕ),
thus depends on its export status:
rf (ϕ) =
{
rdf (ϕ) if the firm does not export
rdf (ϕ) + r
x
f (ϕ) if the firm exports.
As illustrated before, foreign firms can only operate domestically or as regular
exporters, therefore, no foreign firms ever export and not also produce for its domestic
market. Each firm’s profit is separated into portions earned from domestic sales πdf (ϕ)









A foreign firm that produces for its domestic market and exports if πxf (ϕ) ≥ 0. Each
firm’s combined profits can then be written as πf (ϕ) = π
d
f (ϕ) + max{0, πxf (ϕ)}.
2.3.3 Firm Entry, Exit and Export Status
To produce in country i ∈ {c, f}, firms must make an initial investment fewi > 0
(measure in units of labor), which is thereafter sunk. Firms then draw their produc-
tivity ϕ from a distribution g(ϕ), with cumulative distribution G(ϕ), which is assumed
4The types of domestic trade barriers include physical barriers, outright prohibition through ad-
ministrative decree, financial benefits for firms selling local goods, local purchasing quotas, poor
infrastructure and business conditions, less efficient government. Domestic trade barriers are not spe-
cific to China. For example, in Russia, regional government limits beer import from other regions
(Guriev et al., 2007; Wong, 2012; Pflüger and Russek, 2013).
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to be common across countries. Firms then face an exogenous probability δ of death
each period. An entering firm with productivity ϕ would then immediately exit if its
profit level is negative, or would produce and earn πi ≥ 0, i ∈ {c, f} in every period
until it is hit with a bad shock and is forced to exit. Assuming that there is no time
















Thus, ϕ∗i = inf{ϕ : vi(ϕ) > 0} identifies the lowest productivity level (hereafter referred
to the cutoff level) of producing firms. Since πi(0) = −f is negative, πi(ϕ∗) must be
equal to zero. This will be referred to the zero cutoff profit condition.
In particularly, a Chinese firm obtains the information about its productivity level

































These three cutoffs are, respectively, the productivity level above which a Chinese
firm would find it profitable to produce solely for Foreign Country {πsc(ϕ) = 0}, and
the productivity level necessary for a firm to choose to become a domestic producer
{πdc (ϕ) = 0}. Additionally, ϕ∗x= inf {ϕ : ϕ ≥ ϕ∗d and πxc (ϕ) > 0} represents the cutoff
productivity level for regular exporting Chinese firms.
fewc
Processing Trade Regime
ϕ∗s ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗d
Serve the Domestic Market
Serve the Foreign Market
ϕ ≥ ϕ∗x
ϕ ≥ ϕ∗d
Figure 2.1: Choice of production mode in China
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As shown in Figure 2.1, successful entrants choose to engage in processing trade
or regular production mode based on their idiosyncratic productivity. In accordance
with the empirical evidence that Chinese processing exporters are the least efficient














x. That is, a Chinese firm, the
productivity of which covering the fixed production costs serves Foreign Country only.
A Chinese firm, the productivity of which is able to pay for the production and fixed
domestic trade costs, chooses to serve the domestic market. A Chinese firm drawing a
sufficiently high productivity chooses to serve both markets.
Any entering Chinese firm drawing a productivity level ϕ < ϕ∗s immediately exit
and never produce. The equilibrium productivity distribution µc(ϕ) of Chinese firms





if ϕ ≥ ϕ∗s
0 otherwise
and pinc ≡ 1 − G(ϕ∗s) is the Chinese firms’ ex ante probability of successful entry to














































These equations show how the shape of equilibrium distribution of productivity levels is
tied to the exogenous ex ante distribution g(ϕ) while allowing the range of productivity
levels (indexed by the cutoffs) to be endogenously determined.
Chinese firms’ decisions concerning production for the domestic and foreign markets










represents the ex ante probability that one of these successful firms
engages in regular production mode; while pxc =
1−G(ϕ∗x)
1−G(ϕ∗d)
denotes the probability of
exporting conditional on serving the domestic market. Furthermore, Mc is the mass of
producing firms and M ec is the mass of entrants in China. Consequently, the mass of
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Figure 2.2: Zero-profit, processing exporting and regular exporting productivity in China
processing exporters, domestic firms and exporting firms in China are represented by













Foreign firms follow the conventional pattern in literature. Once the sunk costs
of entry fewf are paid, a firm draw its productivity ϕ from a fixed distribution g(ϕ).
There are two cutoff productivities, the domestic zero profit productivity, ϕ∗df , above
which firms produce for their own domestic market; and the exporting productivity



















The conventional sorting condition of selection into export market (ϕ∗xf > ϕ
∗
df ) requires
strictly positive fixed exporting costs and sufficient high values of both fixed and vari-




c . In this sense, the revenue needed to
serve the export market is larger relative to the revenue needed to cover the domestic
trade costs.
Foreign firms’ decision concerning production for their own domestic market and
Chinese market are summarized graphically in Figure 2.3. Of the mass of foreign
firms, Mf , G(ϕ
∗
df ), draw a productivity level sufficient low that they are unable to
cover any costs and exit the industry immediately; a fraction, G(ϕ∗xf )−G(ϕ∗df ), draw
an intermediate productivity such that they could afford the cost of production and
domestic trade barriers and serve its own domestic market; a fraction, 1 − G(ϕ∗xf ),
has a sufficient high productivity level that it is profitable to serve both markets.
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Figure 2.3: Zero-profit and exporting productivity in Foreign Country.
Once again, the equilibrium distribution of productivity for incumbent firms, µf (ϕ) =
g(ϕ)/[1−G(ϕ∗df )] ∀ϕ ≥ ϕ∗df , is determined by ex ante probability of firm productivity




. Accordingly, the aggregate productivity levels for foreign domestic

























Analogously to China, the total number of producing firms is denoted by Mf and
the mass of exporting firms is Mxf = p
x
fMf in Foreign Country. However, the total




c , which implies the
mass of producing firms is not equal to the total varieties available to consumers in
Foreign Country (Mf 6= M sc +Mxc +Mf ). Similarly, the total mass of varieties available
to consumers in China is Mdc +M
x
f , which indicates the total varieties that produced in
China is not equal to the total varieties available to Chinese consumer (Mc 6= Mdc +Mxf ).
The construction of productivity averages in both regions can also be used to ex-





c) represent the average revenue and profit earned by Chinese processing ex-
porters from sales in Foreign Country, whereas rdi (ϕ̃
d




i ) describe the average





i ) depict the average export revenue and profit earned by domestic regular
exporters. The overall average, across all types of firms, of combined revenue, earned
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The partitioning of firms by export status in both countries can be obtained if and
only if τσ−1f < f+fd < τ




c is satisfied. That is,
beachhead costs with variable export costs are relatively small to production costs plus





c is holding. Satisfying these conditions make the model generates partitioning
of the coexistence, within a narrowly defined industry, of processing exporters, non-





draws special attention. Substituting the total revenue Ri with total labor income




c and Rf > Rc. That is, the price index in
China, Pc, is high relative to the foreign price index, Pf , and Foreign Country has a
lower true costs of living index and a higher utility level relative to China (Uf > Uc). In
other words, as a consequence of a very large proportion of processing trade, Chinese
consumers are faced with higher prices while foreign consumers reap the benefits of
cheap processed goods.
2.3.4 Equilibrium Conditions
The zero cutoff profit conditions in both countries imply a relationship between the
average profit per firm and the cutoff productivity levels:
πsc(ϕ
∗
s) = 0 ⇐⇒ πsc(ϕ̃sc) = fwck(ϕ∗s),
πdc (ϕ
∗
d) = 0 ⇐⇒ πdc (ϕ̃dc) = (f + fd)wck(ϕ∗d),
πxc (ϕ
∗
x) = 0 ⇐⇒ πxc (ϕ̃xc ) = fxwck(ϕ∗x),
where k(ϕ) = [(ϕ̃(ϕ)/ϕ)σ−1 − 1]. The expression for the corresponding variables of
foreign firms are defined analogously:
πdf (ϕ
∗
df ) = 0 ⇐⇒ πdf (ϕ̃df ) = (f + fd)wfk(ϕ∗df ),
πxf (ϕ
∗
xf ) = 0 ⇐⇒ πxf (ϕ̃xf ) = fxwfk(ϕ∗xf ).
The zero cutoff profit conditions also imply that all other cutoff productivity levels can



































































































= (f + fd)wfk(ϕ
∗





where all other cutoff productivity levels and fractions of exporting firms are implicitly
defined as a function of domestic cutoff level using equations (2.20) -2.22. The equations
(ZCP1) and (ZCP2) thus identify the zero cutoff profit conditions for China and Foreign
Country.
2.3.5 Determination of the Equilibrium
The potential entrants enter the industry until the expected value of entry, Vi, equals
the sunk entry costs, fewi. The expected value of entry Vi is the ex ante probability
of successful entry, 1 − G(ϕi), multiplied by the expected profits of producing goods








π̄f = fewf , (FE2)
where π̄i is the average firm profit from successful entry. In particular, some low produc-
tive Chinese firms fully export to Foreign Country, while some intermediate productive
Chinese firms concentrate on domestic market. With the definition of weighted aver-
age productivity above, the free entry conditions in China and Foreign Country can





































Using the relationship between productivity cutoffs (2.20) - (2.22), and noting that
J(·) is a decreasing function, the above free entry conditions identify unique equilib-
rium values of domestic cutoffs for China and Foreign Country (ϕ∗d and ϕ
∗
df ). These




xf ) as well as average pro-
ductivity levels and the ex ante successful entry and export probabilities. In addition,
the increase in fixed production costs, f , fixed domestic trade costs, fd, and fixed ex-




df in both regions. The
higher fixed costs indicate that firms must draw a higher productivity to earn sufficient
revenue to overcome these costs. On the other hand, raising these costs reduce the
mass of goods produced, improve firms’ex post profitability, and therefore increases
the probability of less productive firms surviving in the industry.
In a stationary equilibrium with constant mass of operating firms, the mass of
successful new entrants must equal the mass of incumbents that die: [1−G(ϕ∗i )]M ei =
δMi. Product variety in a destination is given by the total mass of sellers. Hence, the







































where Mki is the mass of operating firm choosing production mode k in country i.
Notice that M sc denotes the varieties produced by Chinese processing exporters but
only consumed in Foreign Country. As a result, the price indices vary across these two
regions.
The comparison of industry cutoff productivity (2.7) and domestic productivity





implies that firms located in Foreign Country have better accesses to obtaining a pro-
ductivity above any cutoff level, and that only more productive firms can survive. By
contrast, ex ante Chinese firms draw lower productivity levels relative to their coun-
terpart in Foreign Country. The productivity cutoff level of surviving Foreign firms,
ϕ∗df , is therefore higher than ϕ
∗
s. Foreign firms face more severe competition both from
Chinese processing and regular exporters compared to that faced by Chinese firms in
its own market, result in ϕ∗x < ϕ
∗
xf . In particular, firms in Foreign Country with better
productivity distribution is associated with higher productivity, a lower price index and
a higher welfare per worker relative to that of China. These results fit the empirical
feature that China is a technology inferior country relative to developed countries, e.g.
the US.
The labor market clearing condition requires that, in both countries, total labor
used for production and the investment (by new entrants) must equal the total labor
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endowment




, i ∈ {c, f},
where µi(ϕ) is the ex post distribution of operating firms across productivity levels in
country i, and lki is the optimal labor demand for a firm with productivity ϕ using
production mode k in country i. The mass of producing firms, Mi, can be determined










































Other things equal, the rise in average productivity following the opening of trade
reduces the mass of domestically produced varieties. The trade balance condition is
derived from labor market clearing, free entry, zero-profit productivity cutoff conditions


















To put it another way, the total value of China’s manufacturing export must equal the
value of manufacturing import produced by foreign firms.
The equilibrium is referenced by a vector of variables in China and Foreign Country:
{ϕ∗s, ϕ∗d, ϕ∗x, ϕ∗df , ϕ∗xf}. All other endogenous variables (Mc,Mf , Pc, Pf ) can be written
as functions of these quantities such that the labor market is clearing, free entry and
aggregate expenditure equations are satisfied in both countries and the balance trade
condition holds. I show in Appendix 2.6.2 that there exists a unique equilibrium.
2.4 Impact of Trade Liberalization
The preceding analysis has shown that the presence of processing trade along with
the fixed domestic trade costs and export entry costs can induce a partitioning of
firms by export status, based on firm productivity. Nevertheless, this result is not
exactly surprising. The current model is well-suited to address several important issues
concerning the impact of trade liberalization with the existence of processing trade
and firm heterogeneity: do all firms within a sector benefit from trade, or does the
impact depend on firm productivity? How are the aggregate productivity and welfare
affected in the presence of processing trade? What happens to the range of firm
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productivity levels? In particular, this model is much better suited to tackle several
different mechanisms that would produce an increase in trade exposure and plausibly
correspond to the observed decreases in trade cost over time or some specific policies
to liberalized trade. The effects of such mechanisms are investigated: a decrease in
either fixed or variable export trade costs and a reduction in domestic trade costs.
These three scenarios involve comparative statics of the open economy equilibrium
with respect to fx, τ and fd. I show that trade liberalization in fixed export costs (fd)
force the least productive Chinese processing exporters to exit, while simultaneously
raises domestic productivity levels in both countries. Moreover, falling variable export
costs (τ) generate similar result relative to the decrease of fx. The only difference is
that the industry cutoff productivity level has decreased in China. Besides, a more
integrated domestic market forces the least productive Chinese processing exporters
to exit and has an overall positive impact on welfare in both regions. In summary, all
these changes unequivocally deliver welfare gains and nations always benefit from freer
trade.
2.4.1 Decreases in Fixed Export Costs
I first investigate the effect of a decrease in the fixed export costs fx. Throughout the
comparative static analysis, I have used the old notation to describe the old equilibrium.
I then added primes (′) to all variables and functions when they pertain to the new
equilibrium with f ′x < fx.
Proposition 1. A decrease in fixed export trade costs forces the least efficient firms to
exit and therefore generates productivity improvements in both regions. It also creates
the entry of new regular firms into the export markets in both countries.
For Proof: See Appendix 2.6.3.
Trade liberalization in fixed export costs induces an increase in the industry cutoff
productivity levels in both countries and a decrease in regular export levels. Falling




In particular, a reduction in barriers to trade leads to all surviving Chinese processing
exporters incurring revenue and profit losses rsc
′(ϕ) < rsc(ϕ). The reduction in profits
from the foreign market causes some low-efficient processing exporters that were previ-
ously marginal to exit dropping out from industry. As the low-productivity processing
exporters exit, resources are reallocated toward higher-productivity firms.
With respect to the non-processing firms, the increased exposure to trade improves
the productivity thresholds of serving domestic markets: ϕ∗d
′ > ϕ∗d and ϕ
∗
df
′ > ϕ∗df in
both countries. Notably, this causes the least productive Chinese regular firms with
productivity levels between ϕ∗d and ϕ
∗
d
′ to no longer be able to earn positive profits
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Figure 2.4: The impact of falling fx on productivity cutoffs in China
in domestic market and hence force them to engage in processing trade. By contrast,
the least productive foreign firms (ϕ∗df ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗df ′) are forced to exit. Furthermore, all
existing domestic regular firms in both regions relinquish a portion of their domestic
revenue: rdi
′
(ϕ) < rdi (ϕ), i ∈ {c, f}. On the other hand, the decreased export thresholds
(ϕxi decrease) generate the entry of new firms into the export market. Regular firms
which do not export with high fx are then able to serve the foreign market and their
combined sales increase with falling fx. Firms that already exported prior to the change
in fx not increase their combined revenue and profits. Trade liberalization therefore
reallocates revenue and profits away from the least efficient firms that exit toward more
productive firms that enter the regular export markets. The reallocations of revenue
and profits generate an aggregate productivity improvement and an increase in welfare
in both countries. Figure 2.4 graphically represents the changes in productivity cutoffs
driven by falling fx in China.
2.4.2 Decreases in Variable Trade Costs
Proposition 2. The falling variable trade costs reduce the productivity cutoff of pro-
cessing exporters and cause the entry of more inefficient firms in China. The regular
export cutoff productivity levels decrease as well. By contrast, declining variable costs
induce an increase in the domestic cutoff productivity levels in both regions.
For Proof: See Appendix 2.6.3.
A decrease in the variable trade costs from τ to τ ′ distributes different effects to
Chinese and foreign firms. The evolution of firms in Foreign Country follows the
conventional pattern as outlined by Melitz (2003). The least productive foreign firms
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Figure 2.5: The impact of falling τ on productivity cutoffs in China
are forced to exit, and therefore the industrial productivity cutoff level rises ϕ∗df
′ > ϕ∗df .
In contrast, changes in τ shift down the export productivity cutoff level ϕ∗xf
′ < ϕ∗xf .
The increased exposure to trade generates the entry of new regular firms into the
export market (that did not export with the higher τ). All firms lose a portion of
their domestic sales, so that the firms that do not export incur both a revenue and
profit loss. The more productive firms that export more than make up for the loss of
domestic sales with increased export sales, and the most productive firms among this
group also increase their profits: rdf
′
(ϕ) + rxf
′(ϕ) > rdf (ϕ) + r
x
f (ϕ).
On the other hand, the decline in variable trade costs distinctly impacts to the pro-
cessing exporters and non-processing firms in China. Falling iceberg trade costs τ raise
the domestic cutoff level: ϕ∗d
′ > ϕ∗d, and the aggregate domestic productivity in China.
Non-exporters previously producing with low productivity levels can no longer earn
positive profits from regular production mode, and hence switch into processing trade
instead of exiting the industry. Furthermore, it causes the entry of more low-productive
processing exporters. That is, the falling transport costs τ particularly benefit them
as it creates more export opportunities, offers greater revenues and profits, and pays
fewer costs. As shown in Figure 2.5, this leads to more of the low-productive firms
self-selecting into processing trade: ϕ∗s
′ < ϕ∗s. In other words, a fall in transport costs
promotes processing activities in China. However, as more Chinese firms become pro-
cessing exporters, a larger set of varieties produced by Chinese firms with productivity
ϕ ∈ [ϕ∗s ′, ϕ∗d′) becomes unavailable to Chinese consumers.
To put it differently, a greater openness raises ϕ∗d and thus decreases locally pro-
duced varieties. The lower variable trade costs produce an “anti-variety” effect, i.e., the
range of consumed variety in China falls as trade becomes freer. By contrast, Foreign
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Country experiences a “pro-variety effect”, as more varieties manufactured by Chinese
processing exporters become available to foreign consumers. Nevertheless, welfare al-
ways increases with trade freeness in both regions, because the increased labor demand
(by the less productive firms and new entrants) causes the real wage to increase. It
therefore pulls more low-productive non-exporters switching into processing trade, as
these firms could not afford to cover the entry costs of the domestic market. In par-
ticular, combing the falling variable and fix export costs together help to explain the
observed empirical pattern of export booms in China in the 2000s, which are driven
by the entry of processing firms into the export market.5
2.4.3 Decreases in Domestic Trade Costs
Proposition 3. The falling domestic trade costs raise the cutoff productivity level of
processing exporters in China while decreasing the productivity thresholds of serving
the domestic market in both regions. The freer domestic trade also raises the export
productivity cutoffs in both countries.
For Proof: See Appendix 2.6.3.
Figure 2.6: The impact of falling fd on productivity cutoffs in China
Lowering domestic entry costs fd raise the industry cutoff productivity in China
ϕ∗s
′ > ϕ∗s, and thus forces the least efficient processing exporters to exit. The falling
5Documented in Lemoine and Ünal-Kesenci (2004); Yu and Tian (2012); and Manova and Yu
(2016), the accession to WTO substantially reduced the average tariff to 9 percent and dramatically
increased the prevalence of processing trade in China, in which the share of processing exporters among
all exporters increased from 30 percent to 40 percent in 2006 and constituted one-half of China’s total
trade in the 2000s.
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costs of entry into domestic market also force all existing Chinese processing exporters
to lose a portion of revenue obtained from Foreign Country: rsc
′(ϕ) < rsc(ϕ), ∀ ∈
ϕ[ϕ∗s, ϕ
∗
d). Conversely, falling domestic trade barriers decrease the domestic cutoff pro-
ductivity levels in both countries. In particular, the declines in domestic trade costs in
China substantially reduce the barriers of serving domestic market, which create the
entry of new domestic firms. The previously relative efficient processing exporters that
were not able to pursue regular production mode are capable of engaging in domestic
trade with lower fd. Also, these new domestic producers benefit from the more inte-
grated domestic market as their revenue and profits increase. However, the successful
entry of less productive processing exporters into the domestic market contributes to
an aggregate domestic productivity loss. Moreover, the factors of increased industry
cutoff productivity level and decreased domestic productivity threshold in China indi-
cate that more Chinese firms are operating in regular production mode, and thus the
competition in the domestic market is intensified. By contrast, as fewer Chinese firms
engage in processing trade, fewer varieties are manufactured by Chinese processing
exporters, which result in fewer varieties being supplied to foreign consumers.
Another way to gain insight into the impact of falling domestic barriers comes from
the consumption side. A falling in domestic costs decreases the domestic cutoff pro-
ductivity levels and therefore reduces the average profits of existing regular firms in
both regions. The lower profit levels, in turn, imply an increase in domestic variety.
The increasing product variety and the decreasing aggregate domestic productivity op-
positely affects welfare. The appendix 2.6.3 shows that the welfare change is positive,
and hence that the expanding product variety effect dominates that of the lower aggre-
gate domestic productivity levels. This yields the reasonable property: lower domestic
trade costs have an overall positive impact on welfare. In other words, if the domestic
impediments were to hasten, it could alleviate China’s reliance on processing trade and
help China to avoid sticking in the low value-added chain. Figure 2.6 visualizes the
effects of trade liberalization in fd on the cutoff productivity levels of all types of firms
in China.
On the other hand, the decrease from fd to fd
′ induces an increase in the cutoff
productivity levels of regular exporters (ϕxc , ϕ
x
f ↑)6. The more intense entry following
the decreased domestic productivity thresholds in both countries enhances domestic
6Melitz (2003) states that there is a transitional issue associated with the exporting status of firms
with productivity level between ϕxc and ϕ
x
c
′. The loss of export sales to counterpart (from rxc (ϕ) down
to the rxc
′(ϕ)) is such that firms entering with productivity levels between ϕxc and ϕ
x
c
′ will not export
as the lower variable profit
rxc
′(ϕ)
σ no longer covers the amortized portion of the entry costs fx. On the
other hand, incumbent firms with productivity level in this range have already incurred the sunk entry
costs of export and have no reason to exit the export market until they are hit with the bad shock
and exit the industry. Eventually, all these incumbent firms exit and no firm with a productivity level
in that range will export once the new steady state equilibrium is attained.
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product market competition and therefore raises the export productivity levels. That
is, the productivity of survival is lowered while the export cutoff increases when the
domestic market becomes more integrated.
The falling domestic trade costs deliver profound policy implications to China.
Empirical evidence (Naughton, 2003; Wong, 2012) have documented that China has
a very segmented domestic market; domestic firms incur barriers to serve local mar-
kets. Some other studies have demonstrated that the internal market fragmentation
promotes China’s trade performance. Less efficient Chinese firms, which are not able
to overcome such costs, engage in processing trade and serve the foreign countries.
That is, processing exporters enter the international market as an alternative way to
survive. The factors of the severe fragmented Chinese market and the pervasive of
processing trade distort firm export behavior, which not only generate a large number
of processing exporters but also contribute to the rapid expansion of China’s export.
The highly fragmented domestic market has led to many Chinese firms only engag-
ing in processing trade and getting supplied original equipment manufacturing products
for the global buyers. Nevertheless, they fail to establish a position in the international
market for innovative and high value-added products. Although local protection mea-
sures may help to lift local economies in the short term, the distorted national market
has spawned problems such as higher operation costs and overcapacity in the wider
economy, undermining the economies of scale of China’s huge market. Consequently,
clearing domestic market barriers, coupled with reducing export reliance on processing
trade, could allow the most productive ones to thrive, facilitate technology diffusion,
improve productivity and ultimately increase the competitiveness of firms and growth
in China. To this end, the model offers a theoretical basis for constructing an integrated
Chinese domestic market. In particular, building a unified and open market system can
allow productivity to play a decisive role in allocating resources, and hence bring ag-
gregate productivity growth when facing trade liberalization. Furthermore, the results
and intuitions presented here indicate that gains from more liberalized trade could be
larger for the more integrated internal market. This implies that China would respond
to more export opportunities resulting from falling trade barriers if the government can
unify the domestic market and liberalize domestic trade. The sooner a well-developed
modern market system is established, the higher the aggregate productivity would
likely be, and the smoother the transition.
2.5 Conclusion
Firm-level export patterns in China are different from those in developed countries
and they may seem to be at odds with existing literature. Nevertheless, this can
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be explained by isolating processing trade from the regular export in the context of
heterogeneous firms model. This paper therefore incorporates processing exporters into
a single sector of Melitz (2003) model to explain how the pattern of trade in China
is determined by the interaction of trade barriers and processing trade. This model
captures the existence of processing exporters and explains their inferior productivity
levels. It also shows how trade liberalization affects the aggregate productivity, welfare
and export performances of Chinese firms.
In other words, this paper has described and analyzed a fundamental issue of co-
existence, even within the same industry of exporters, processing exporters, and non-
exporters. The paper shows how the presence of processing trade alongside the domes-
tic trade costs drastically affect how the impact of trade is distributed across different
types of firms. The less efficient firms behave as processing exporters, the moderate
productive firms concentrate on the domestic market while the most efficient ones ben-
efit from trade in revenues and profits. More importantly, the analysis reveals that
increases in a country’s exposure to trade unequivocally engender welfare gains. How-
ever, the domestic market distortion could impede firm performance and hinder the
aggregate productivity improvement. Furthermore, the model highlights that trade-
induced reallocation effect of export which may generate aggregate productivity growth
does not work effectively in industries where processing trade is pervasive.
The recognition of the nature of firm heterogeneity is important because it will
generate new insights concerning the current trade pattern and growth. Exporting is
especially considered as an engine of growth in China. Processing trade indeed has
a significant positive effect on labor employment and it substantially utilizes China’s
comparative advantage in labor-intensive products. However, the long-run benefits as-
sociated with trade still depends on the productivity. It is therefore imperative to have
a model that can look into the costs and benefits of export processing and predict the
impact of trade policies on various types of firms. Consequently, a deeper understanding
of the factors that drive firms’ export success will facilitate the design of policies that
promote trade and ultimately growth in China. Interesting areas for future research
include investigating the impact of trade liberalization on foreign-owned, private firms
and state-own enterprises separately and empirically testing of my model’s theoretical
predictions. Also, further quantitative analysis of the effect of trade liberalization on
wages and welfare in both China and other countries would be interesting.
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Derivation of Average Revenue
































































































































x, and parameters. The
average revenue of a foreign firm can be derived as the similar way











Derivation of Free Entry Conditions
Combining the ZCP1 and FE1, and use the definition of aggregate average pro-

















































































































































































































































































Similarly, combining the ZCP2 and FE2, and use the definition of aggregate average
productivity from 2.16-2.17, we obtain a single equation that determines the produc-
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2.6.2 Determination of the Equilibrium
Derivation of Price Indices
Using the equilibrium pricing rules, domestic cutoff productivity in China, foreign
exporting productivity threshold, and the ex post productivity distributions from both









































































































Analogously, using the equilibrium pricing rules, zero profit productivity cutoff in For-
eign Country, processing and regular export productivity cutoff levels of Chinese firms,
and the ex post productivity distributions from both countries, the price index in For-














































































































































Balanced trade condition implies the representative agents in both countries each









































































































































Existence and Uniqueness of the Equilibrium Cutoff Level
With asymmetric countries, the steady-state industry equilibrium can be referenced
by a vector of variables {ϕ∗s, ϕ∗d, ϕ∗x, ϕ∗df , ϕ∗xf , Rc, Rf , Pc, Pf}, in terms of which all other












































σ−1 is defined a function of ϕ∗df .
Proof J(ϕ) is decreasing function on (0,+∞)









































































































































We have defined J(ϕ∗s) = [G(ϕ
∗
d) − G(ϕ∗s)]k(ϕ∗s), then its derivative and elasticity
is given by:
J ′(ϕ∗s) = −g′(ϕ∗s)k(ϕ∗s) + (G(ϕ∗d)−G(ϕ∗s))k′(ϕ∗s)





















ϕ∗s(σ − 1)(G(ϕ∗d)−G(ϕ∗s))(k(ϕ∗s) + 1)
[G(ϕ∗d)−G(ϕ∗s)]k(ϕ∗s)






< −(σ − 1). (2.33)







































− (σ − 1)[k(ϕ) + 1]
ϕ
=
k(ϕ)g(ϕ)ϕ− (σ − 1)[k(ϕ) + 1](1−G(ϕ))
(1−G(ϕ))ϕ
We have defined J(ϕ) = [1−G(ϕ)]k(ϕ), then its derivative and elasticity are given
by:
J ′(ϕ) = − 1
ϕ
(σ − 1)[k(ϕ) + 1](1−G(ϕ)) < 0, (2.35)
J ′(ϕ)ϕ
J(ϕ)






< −(σ − 1). (2.36)
Therefore, we have proved J(ϕ) is non-negative and its elasticity with respect to ϕ
is negative and bounded away from zero, J(ϕ) must be decreasing to zero as ϕ goes to
infinity. Furthermore, limϕ→0 J(ϕ) = ∞ since limϕ→0 k(ϕ) = ∞. Thus, J(ϕ) = [1 −












Consequently, the right-hand side of (2.23) and (2.24) must also monotonically decrease
from infinity to zero on (0,∞). The left-hand side of these two equations are constant.
Consequently, (2.23) identifies a unique cutoff level ϕ∗d in China and (2.24) determines
the industry productivity cutoff ϕ∗df in Foreign Country. Having determined these




xf follows immediately from
the relationship between the productivity cutoffs from (2.20) - (2.22). These unique
7This proof is from Melitz (2003).
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productivity cutoffs, in turn, determine the average productivity levels according to
formulas (2.11) - (2.13). The ex ante successful entry in both countries, domestic and
regular export probabilities are also fixed.
Aggregate revenue is exogenously determined and must equal the labor supply
multiply wage, Ri = wiL in both countries. The price index Pc (2.25) has two com-







f ); the mass of foreign firms that export to China
Mxf = p
x
fMf , and the mass of Chinese regular firms, M
d












which in turn depend solely by two productivity cutoffs, ϕ∗d and ϕ
∗
xf , that were de-
termined in (2.12) and (2.17). The probability of foreign firms export to China,
pxf = [1 − G(ϕ∗xf )]/[1 − G(ϕ∗df )], also follows from the two productivity cutoffs, ϕ∗df
and ϕ∗xf . Similarly, the price index Pf (2.26) in Foreign Country consists of three
terms: the prices of a variety with weighted average productivity from foreign produc-
ers pdf (ϕ̃
d








c ); the mass of
foreign firms Mf , the mass of Chinese processing exporters M
s
c and regular exporters












c ) are solely rely on three productivity cut-




x that were determined above. The probability of being Chinese
processing exporters, psc = [G(ϕ
∗
d) − G(ϕ∗s)]/[1 − G(ϕ∗s)], and the probability of regu-
lar export from China to Foreign Country pxc = [1 − G(ϕ∗x)]/[1 − G(ϕ∗d)], also follows
from the productivity cutoffs, ϕ∗s, ϕ
∗
d and ϕx. Finally, the mass of firms in both re-
gions equals the ratio of aggregate revenue to average revenue, as shown in (2.27) and
(2.28). Aggregate revenue was solved above, while average revenue depends solely on
the already-determined productive cutoffs. This completes the characterization of the
equilibrium.
Welfare






















Since ϕ∗df > ϕ
∗
d, welfare in foreign country must be higher than in China: Wf >Wc.
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2.6.3 The Impact of Trade Liberalization
These comparative statics are all derived from the equilibrium condition for the cutoff
levels from (2.23) and (2.24); and the implicit definition of ϕ∗x and ϕ
∗
s as a function
of ϕ∗d from (2.17) and (2.20) in China; ϕ
∗
xf as a function of ϕ
∗
df from (2.21) in Foreign
Country.
Decrease in Fixed Export Trade Costs
Changes in the cutoff levels:





































































Differentiating free entry conditions of (2.23) and (2.24) in both countries with respect

















































































Welfare : Recall from (2.37) and (2.38) that welfare must therefore rise with the
decrease in fx since all of these changes induce an increase in the domestic cutoff
productivity levels ϕ∗d and ϕ
∗
df .
The decrease in fixed export cost fx induces an increase in the cutoff productivity
level of processing exporters. Recall that rsc(ϕ) = (ϕ/ϕ
∗
s)
σ−1σwcf (∀ϕ∗s ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗d).
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rsc(ϕ) therefore decreases with falling export barriers since this change induces an in-
crease in the cutoff productivity level. Thus rsc
′(ϕ) < rsc(ϕ) whenever fx
′ < fx since
ϕ∗s
′ > ϕ∗s. In other words, the decline in export market access costs drives the least
efficient processing exporters out of the market, and reduces revenue and profits of all
existing processing exporters.
A decrease in fx induces an increase in the domestic cutoff levels in both countries.
Take China as an example, recall that rdc (ϕ) = (ϕ/ϕ
∗
d
σ−1)σwc(f + fd) ∀ ϕ ≥ ϕ∗d. Thus,
rdc
′
(ϕ) < rdc (ϕ), ∀ ϕ ≥ ϕ∗d′ since ϕ∗d′ > ϕ∗d. All existing domestic producers in the
new equilibrium with fx
′ fixed export cost lose a fraction of revenue from the domestic
market. In particular, regular producers in China with productivity levels between ϕ∗d
and ϕ∗d
′ switch to pursue processing trade, while the foreign firms with productivity
ϕ ∈ [ϕ∗df , ϕ∗df ′) exit.
For firms that already exported (ϕ ≥ ϕ∗x) prior to the change in fx, the direction
of change in combined domestic and export sales rdc (ϕ) + r
x
c (ϕ) = (1 + τ
1−σ)rdc (ϕ)
decreases in the same proportion as its domestic sales when fx decreases since 1 + τ
σ−1
remains constant.
Trade liberalization in fx reduces the regular export cutoffs in both regions, and
hence generates a new category of firms with intermediate productivity levels (ϕ∗x
′ ≤
ϕ < ϕ∗x) that enters the export market as a consequence of the decrease in fx. The
new export sales generate an increase in revenue for all these firms since rdc (ϕ) <
rcd(ϕ) + r
x
c (ϕ) = (1 + τ
σ−1)rdc (ϕ).
Decrease in Variable Trade Costs
Changes in the cutoff levels:
































































































































since J ′(ϕ) < 0 ∀ϕ, and
∂ϕ∗s
∂τ
= − (f + fd)J
′(ϕ∗d)



























Welfare : Recall from (2.37) and (2.38) that welfare must therefore rise with de-




As stated previously, we have rsc(ϕ) = (ϕ/ϕ
∗
s)
σ−1σwcf (∀ ϕ∗s ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗d). rsc(ϕ)
therefore increases with decreases in τ since this change induces a decrease in the
cutoff productivity of processing exporters (ϕ∗s ↓). Thus rsc ′(ϕ) > rsc(ϕ) ∀ ϕ∗s ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗d
whenever τ ′ < τ (since ϕ∗s
′ < ϕ∗s).




fd) (∀ ϕ ≥ ϕ∗d). A decrease in τ induce an increase in the domestic cutoff productivity
level (ϕ∗d ↑) and rdc (ϕ) therefore decreases. Foreign Country also behaves the similar
pattern that freer trade improves the industry productivity threshold and reduces the
revenue and profits of all existing domestic firms. However, in contrast to Foreign
Country, a set of Chinese firms with productivity ϕ ∈ [ϕ∗d, ϕ∗d′) which would have
otherwise been forced to exit switching to processing trade in face of decreasing τ .
Take China as an example, the direction of the change in combined domestic and
export sales of Chinese regular exporters, rdc (ϕ) + r
x
c (ϕ) = (1 + τ
1−σ)rdc (ϕ)
8, will
depend on the direction of the change in (1 + τ 1−σ)/(ϕ∗d)
σ−1. It is now shown that

















































8Recall that rxc (ϕ) = τ




























1 + τ 1−σ
























That is, the combined sales of regular exporters rise when τ decrease.
The profit change of a processing exporter (ϕ∗s ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗d) that is already in pro-




















the term in the bracket is positive since ϕ∗s
′ < ϕ∗s. The processing exporter that export
both before and after the change in τ enjoy a profit increases.
The drop in τ forces previous less efficient domestic producers with productivity
level (ϕ∗d ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗d′) in China pursuing processing trade, the profit change of this type
of firms can be written as:















substituting (2.7) and (2.8) into the above equation reveals the term in the bracket
must be negative. The switching from regular production mode to processing trade
incurs both revenue and profit loss.
As was the case with the decrease in fx, falling variable trade costs τ shift down
the export productivity level from ϕ∗x to ϕ
∗
x
′. This generates the entry of new firms
into the export market. All the new regular exporters enjoy a revenue gain, but only
a portion of these firms also increase their profits. Specifically, this profit change is
























































Therefore, the firms with productivity ϕ > ϕ† where ϕ∗x
′ < ϕ† < ϕ∗x increase their
profits. Firms with productivity level ϕ > ϕ∗x that export both before and after the
change in τ enjoy a profit increase that is proportional to their combined revenue







1 + (τ ′)σ−1
(ϕ∗d
′)σ−1






where the term in the bracket must be positive.
Decrease in Domestic Trade Costs
Changes in the cutoff levels:













































































































xf − J(ϕ∗df )





Since in China J ′(ϕ∗d) < 0 ∀ϕ, and (f + fd)J ′(ϕ∗d)
∂ϕ∗d
∂fd



























And in Foreign Country J ′(ϕ∗df ) < 0 ∀ϕ, and (f + fd)J ′(ϕ∗df )
∂ϕ∗df
∂fd



















direction of the welfare change induced by a drop in the domestic trade costs is not
immediately obvious as fd enters into the welfare equation. (Recall that a decrease in





> 0). The direction of the welfare change therefore









Increases when fd decreases


























Hence, a decrease in fd generates a welfare gain.
Recall that the aggregate revenue of domestic firms is exogenously given by Rc =
wcL and Rf = wfL. Hence, r
s
c(ϕ)/Rf represents a Chinese processing exporter’s




ϕ∗s ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗d). rsc(ϕ) therefore decreases with falling domestic trade barriers fd since
this change induces a rise in the cutoff productivity level of processing exporters (ϕ∗s ↑).
Thus rsc
′(ϕ) < rsc(ϕ) ∀ ϕ∗s ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗d whenever fd




Falling fd creates the entry of new regular producers in both countries. Take China
as an example, a decline in fd leads to efficient processing exporters switching from
processing trade to regular production and starting to serve the domestic market. For
a new domestic firm (ϕ∗d
′ < ϕ ≤ ϕ∗d), the profit change can be written:















substituting (2.7) and (2.8) into the above equation reveals the term in the bracket
must be positive. The profit change ∆π(ϕ) is thus an increasing function of firm’s
productivity ϕ. Therefore, the new domestic firms increase their revenue and profits.
The impact of changing production mode is similar to Melitz (2003) of moving from
autarky to trade.
For Chinese firms (ϕ∗d ≤ ϕ < ϕ∗x) that already in domestic market prior to the
































> 0. This implies that f+fd
ϕ∗d
σ−1 decreases when fd falling down






σ−1 . This inequality implies that the ∆π(ϕ) is a decreasing
function of ϕ since the bracket in (2.45) is negative. Therefore, an existing domestic
producer experiences both revenue and profits loss in the new equilibrium.
The change in profits earned by a firm that export in the new equilibrium (ϕ ≥ ϕ∗x′)
can be written:










− (fd′ − fd)wc.
The direction of the change in combined domestic and export sales also depends on
f+fd
ϕ∗d




Antidumping: Evidence from China
Abstract
I investigate how Chinese exporters respond to tariff shocks that arise from US an-
tidumping measures. Using Chinese customs data between 2000 and 2006, I provide
strong evidence that antidumping measures severely distort bilateral trade between
China and the US. I do not find any evidence that the US import restrictions resulted
in any changes of Chinese exports to alternative markets. I then explore the adjust-
ments at the firm level. I document that Chinese firms that were hit with antidumping
measures reduce their exports of the targeted products not only to the US but also to
alternative markets, suggesting negative spillover effects. More importantly, antidump-
ing measures are associated with deterrent effects on other products and markets within
firms. That is, multi-product firms reduce their exports of other unaffected products
to alternative markets.
3.1 Introduction
Despite the growing trend of trade liberalization, the use of temporary trade barriers,
such as antidumping and countervailing duties, and safeguards, is on the rise (see
Blonigen and Prusa, 2016). Antidumping measures are particularly important as they
are among the most intensively used forms of trade restrictions.1 An importing country
can levy duties on a trade partner if imported products are dumped and causing injury
to domestic import-competing industries (WTO Antidumping Agreement, Article 3).
Specifically, dumping refers to the practice of exporting a product at a price that is
lower than the price usually charged in the home market or lower than its production
1For example, according to WTO notifications, between 1995 and 2010 a total of 2503 anti-
dumping measures were imposed worldwide, while in the same period safeguards and countervailing
duties accounted for only 101 and 158 measures, respectively.
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cost. The proliferation of antidumping measures has stimulated research to evaluate
their effects on protected products, firms, and industries.
While the literature has generated significant insights on the effects of antidumping
measures on the protected import-competing firms,2 there is much scarcer analysis
of the corresponding impact on affected foreign counterparts. How do antidumping
measures halt trade flows? Do these import restrictions shift exports to alternative
markets? How do the affected firms respond to these market-specific tariff shocks?
Do they deflect the targeted products to third countries? Do these measures have
spillover effects that go beyond the targeted products? Despite their importance for
firm performance, the way these trade restrictions shape the export activities across
products within firms remains poorly understood. In this paper, I attempt to fill these
gaps by exploring the effects of US antidumping measures on the export behavior of
Chinese firms. The analysis of how impacted firms respond to such trade restrictions
could inform us of the true costs of antidumping measures on the exporting countries
and present the story from a different angle.
China serves as a suitable country for this analysis for several reasons. First, it is one
of the most targeted countries by antidumping investigations, and the US is the leading
initiator. This is due to the fact that the US has an increasing trade deficit with China,
and its loss of manufacturing employment (see Pierce and Schott, 2016; David et al.,
2013). For example, China made up 20% of the US antidumping caseload between 2000
and 2006.3 Second, the US is a major trade partner with China, and it is one of the most
important markets for Chinese exporters. For firms that have exported to the US from
2000 to 2006, 25% of their total export value was shipped to the US. This means that
a substantial amount of trade could potentially be shifted to third markets upon the
imposition of US trade restrictions. Third, there is a wealth of available data pertaining
to Chinese firms covering a substantial period replete with antidumping practices,
which makes China an exceptional case for identifying the impact of antidumping
measures on firms.
The objective of this paper is to explore the patterns of export adjustments to an-
tidumping shocks among firms. To do so, I employ a difference-in-differences (DID)
approach. Specifically, my identification strategy is based on the comparison of out-
come variables (e.g. participation, the number of exporters, export value, volume, and
price) for firms exporting the targeted products, compared to firms that do not. That
is, my treatment group consists of products that are under investigations and subject
to antidumping duties (referred to targeted products). The control group includes all
2This includes Konings and Vandenbussche (2005, 2008, 2013); Pierce (2011).
3The US initiated a total of 247 antidumping investigations worldwide between 2000 and 2006, in
which 48 caseloads were against China.
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uninvestigated products within the 4-digit HS4 product category to which the affected
products belong (referred to closely-related products).
I first examine the overall trade responses at the product level. Using detailed Chi-
nese customs data between 2000 and 2006, I find strong evidence that US antidumping
measures severely distort bilateral trade flows between these two countries. Specifi-
cally, antidumping-targeted products experience a drastic fall by somewhere between
50% and 85% in export flows. Additionally, there are significant adverse effects on
the extensive margin. That is, antidumping measures decrease the probability of the
targeted products to be exported and lead to a sharp decline in the number of exporters
serving the US market. I then estimate the impact of US antidumping measures on
Chinese exports to non-US markets. Surprisingly, I do not find evidence that the US
import restrictions result in any changes of Chinese exports of the targeted products
to alternative markets. That is, the changes in trade costs in one country do not affect
the behavior of aggregate exports in another market, where the policy has not changed.
Nevertheless, the aggregate impact at the product level can hide large changes at
the firm level. I therefore explore export adjustments within firms. Not much evidence
exists concerning how exporting firms behave when faced with such export restrictions.
The literature does not inform us whether the affected exporters stop shipping or reduce
exports to the policy-imposing country. Also, it does not tell us whether exporting firms
adjust their exports to other products and destinations.
To this end, I study how firms’ specific patterns of trade are affected by this par-
ticular form of trade restriction. In particular, I look at changes in firms’ behavior
when confronted with regulatory barriers concerning participation in the export mar-
kets, values, quantities of exports, and pricing strategy. As antidumping measures in
general take the form of ad-valorem tariffs, they can be thought of as export costs.
Assuming the existence of a cost of entry in a certain market, recent trade models
(e.g. Melitz, 2003) predict that only the most productive firms in the industry will
continue to export after an increase in such costs. Therefore, the imposition of import
restrictions could affect both the probability of entering a foreign market (extensive
margin) and the associated export flows (intensive margin). Consistent with the litera-
ture, I find that Chinese firms that were subject to the US antidumping measures both
reduce their probability of exporting the targeted products and restrict their existing
trade flows to the US market.
I then turn to the question of whether the imposition of contingency tariffs on
products, affect firms’ exports to other markets as well. To answer this question, I
compare the export patterns of the punished firms to the unpunished ones in alternative
4HS refers to the Harmonized System, which is an internationally standardized system of names
and numbers to classify traded products.
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markets. I find that Chinese firms that were exposed to the disruption of the US market
decrease the probability of exporting the targeted products to alternative markets.
They also reduce their export flows to third markets but charge higher prices. These
findings suggest that antidumping measures may have a trade-reducing effect which
spreads to other destinations within firms. Firms tend to curtail their export expansion
in third markets by lowering volume and raising price to avoid further antidumping
investigations.
A significant and novel contribution of this paper is that I study the extent to which
a tariff shock from the US influences Chinese firms’ export participation, value, volume,
and prices for other untargeted products across markets. I first investigate whether
firms reshuffle their exports to other products in the US market. I find that firms
that have experienced the US trade shocks reduce their export of other uninvestigated
products to the US. This finding suggests that antidumping creates unintended negative
consequences that distort trade of the unaffected products within firms. I next discuss
whether the US antidumping measures generate spillovers across products within firms
to alternative markets. To this end, I assess how the relative changes in trade costs
in one market impact firms’ export decisions into other markets, where the policy has
not changed. I find that firms that confronted antidumping measures in the US also
reduced their trade in other markets. These observations imply that the imposition
of antidumping duties by the US for one product, as an indicator of increased trade
policy uncertainty, negatively spills over to other products and markets within firms.
Overall, my results show that the effects of antidumping measures on firms are
complex. These measures do not only affect exports of the targeted products across
destinations. More impotantly, they generate a deterrent effect which chills trade in
the other products of affected exporters. Hence, trade policy investigations aiming at
specific products should not overlook their negative externalities beyond the targeted
ones.
This paper advances the current literature in three ways. First, it builds on a small
but growing literature documenting the effects of antidumping measures on firms from
targeted countries. Lu et al. (2013) use monthly data on Chinese exports from 2000 to
2006 and find that there is a substantial negative effect of US antidumping protections
on export volumes. Similarly, Chandra and Long (2013) document that the imposition
of US antidumping duties decreases both Chinese firms’ labor productivity and total
factor productivity. My paper differs from prior studies in one key dimension in that I
focus on within-firm adjustments. In light of the increasingly heavy use of antidumping
measures, my estimates of these microeconomic effects are valuable additions to the
current evaluation of such policies.
Secondly, my study sheds light on how trade policy uncertainty affects firms’ export
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decision (i.e., the extensive margin). My main result is that a tariff hike for one product
in the US market is associated with a decline likelihood of that product being exported
across markets from the same punished firm. Debaere and Mostashari (2010), for
example, provide evidence that extensive margin responses to US tariff policy changes
had an effect on overall US imports from that country. The negative effect that I
observe is also in line with the finding presented in Crowley et al. (2018). They show
that the use of antidumping measures in one market leads to a decline in entry both
for the targeted and the closely-related products in that market.
Finally, my paper contributes to the literature that seeks to understand how changes
in export costs have influenced within-firm adjustments across products and destina-
tions. The relevance of this issue is highlighted in the work of Goldberg et al. (2010);
Berthou and Fontagné (2013); Bernard et al. (2014), all of which show how a perma-
nent reduction in trade costs affect the export margins of firms in relation to export
decisions, the number of product exported, and the average sales per products. My
paper complements their work by looking at how a temporary increase in trade barriers
affects firms’ export behavior.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief
summary of an antidumping proceeding in the US. Section 3 defines the treatment and
control groups, as well as a description of the estimation strategy. Section 4 describes
the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 5 presents the empirical findings.
Section 6 concludes.
3.2 The US Antidumping Procedures
In this section, I provide a brief overview of how an antidumping investigation in
the US is carried out and describe the possible outcomes. A flow chart of the US
antidumping proceedings is presented in Figure 3.7 in the Appendix.
To initiate an antidumping investigation, an interested party (e.g. domestic firms
and/or labor unions) must file a petition and submit it to the relevant government
agencies: the Department of Commerce (DoC) and the International Trade Commission
(ITC). The petition contains two pieces of essential information for the analysis. First,
it must specify the exact product that is alleged to have been dumped in the US. The
product is defined at the US 8- or 10-digit HS level.5 Second, the petition has to
indicate which country(-ies) is(are) allegedly dumping. Only the countries named in
the petition are subject to the investigation.
5At the international level, the HS for classifying goods is a 6-digit code system. A code with
a low number of digits defines broad categories of products; additional digits indicate sub-divisions
into more detailed definitions. Countries can add more digits for their own coding to subdivide the
definitions further according to their own needs.
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Within 20 days, the DoC determines whether the petition is affirmative. If so, the
investigation proceeds on a statutory timeline, with the DoC determining whether the
product in question was sold at less than fair value (LTFV) and the ITC determining
whether domestic firms suffered a material injury.
Within 45 days after the date of the filing of the petition, the ITC makes a prelimi-
nary determination on whether the domestic industry is suffering (or is threatened by)
material injury. A negative preliminary decision would end the proceeding. With the
affirmative preliminary ITC determination, the DoC makes a preliminary duty deter-
mination within the next 115 days, of whether the product named in the petition is sold
at LTFV. If the DoC preliminary determination is affirmative, a preliminary duty is
imposed from this time onwards. With a negative determination, the DoC nevertheless
continues to conduct the investigation, although the preliminary duty is not imposed.
The DoC makes a final determination of whether the subject imported merchandise is
being sold or is likely to be sold at LTFV within 75 days of its preliminary decision.
If the DoC final determination is negative, the investigation is terminated. Other-
wise, the ITC has 45 (or 75) days to conduct the final phase of investigation and make
a determination. Once both the DoC and the ITC reach affirmative final determina-
tions, the DoC issues an antidumping order to levy final antidumping duties within
seven days. Once imposed, the antidumping duty can be in place for a maximum of
five years, except if extended (always by sequences of a maximum of five years) through
reviews because of evidence of continuing dumping and injury.
Antidumping measures usually take the form of an ad valorem duty, but could also
be a specific duty, a price/quantity undertaking, or a combination of these. In either
case, the measures are not only country-industry-wide duty but also firm-specific. That
is, relevant US administrative agencies often calculate separate duties for individual
companies that are responsible for the largest share of the investigated product. The
remaining firms exporting the targeted product are subject to an industry-wide an-
tidumping duty. As the US classifies China as a nonmarket economy (NME), Chinese
domestic prices are considered unreliable, so a surrogate country is used to calculate
the antidumping duty. In practice, firm-specific duties are substantially lower than the
industry-wide one (see Figure 3.8 in the Appendix).
The overall investigation process for antidumping cases can be divided into three
stages: (1) the initiation phase, (2) the preliminary duty phase, and (3) the final duty
phase. The initiation phase refers to the period from initiation until any preliminary
duty is levied. The preliminary duty phase starts from when the US importers have
to pay the preliminary antidumping duty until the end of the investigation. During
this stage, the investigation can be withdrawn by the petitioner(s) or suspended if an
agreement is reached between the affected foreign exporters and the DoC. The final duty
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phase begins on the date that the final antidumping duty is imposed and continues until
the date the antidumping order is revoked. Antidumping investigations are usually
concluded within one year (except in special circumstances when the investigation
may last up to 18 months).
3.3 The Empirical Framework
I proceed with the empirical analysis in two steps. First, I estimate the trade effects
of US antidumping measures on Chinese exports at the aggregate product level. Sec-
ondly, I drill down to firms by examining the adjustment across products and markets
to shed light on how these import restrictions shape firms’ specific patterns of trade.
To this end, I also aim to link the export responses observed at the product level to
the micro-level adjustments.
Following Lu et al. (2013), I define the treatment group as the products that are
under investigation and subject to antidumping duties (targeted products). Each prod-
uct in the treatment group is assigned a date of treatment and an ad-valorem duty.
The control group contains all uninvestigated products within the 4-digit HS product
category to which the targeted products belong (closely-related products). This pro-
cedure, therefore, constructs a set of control products that are similar to the treated
products.
3.3.1 Product-level Framework
To evaluate the effects of antidumping measures on Chinese products, I follow Autor
(2003) and pursue a dynamic difference-in-differences (DID) approach. Formally, I
estimate their causal impact by contrasting the export patterns of the targeted and the




















pt = τ) + ε
d
pt, (3.3.1)
where subscripts p, d and t indicate the 6-digit HS product category, destination and
quarter respectively. I assume that the destination markets consist of the United States
(US) and the Rest of the World (RoW). My dependent variables are: (i) a dummy
variable taking a value of 1 for a product p that has positive trade flows into a certain
destination market in quarter t (0 otherwise),6 reflecting export participation; (ii) the
6If we observe positive trade flows of a product p into a certain destination in quarter t but no
export thereafter, we keep the zero observations in quarter t− 1 and t+ 1.
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number of exporters in each product-quarter combination in the US and the RoW;
These two variables estimate the effect on the extensive margin. (iii) the products’
export values and quantities (in logs) to the US and the RoW, with the inclusion of
both positive trade values and zero trade flows (in logs). Including observations of
China’s exit from specific markets allows me to capture the phenomenon that products
may cease being exported to the US entirely;7 and (iv) the log of export prices, proxied
by unit values (the ratio of export value to quantity).
The quarter dummies, γdt , control for overall trends and aggregate shocks that
may affect all products. The 6-digit HS product fixed effects, δdp , capture the time-
invariant product characteristics. The treatment variables Ddp,t+τ take the value of 1
for the punished product p in quarter t if it is exactly τ periods relative to the start of
antidumping investigation for this product. That is, instead of a single treatment effect,
I have included 8 anticipatory effects (β−9 . . . β−2) and 10 post-treatment effects (β0
. . . β9). Of these 18 indicator variables, the indicator variable D
d
p,t+τ(τ<=−9) is equal to
one in each quarter, end with the 9th quarter before the investigation, while Ddp,t+τ(τ>=9)
is equal to 1 in each quarter, starting with the 9th quarter after the investigation. The
remaining indicator variables are equal to 1 only in the relevant quarter. The leads and
lags give the causal effect on the outcomes of interest τ quarters from the measures. I
cluster the standard errors at the 6-digit HS product level throughout, considering the
possible within-product correlation over time.
Crucially, following Jaravel et al. (2018), I include a set of leads and lags around the
investigation time that is common to both the targeted and the closely-related products
(Ld,allpt ). That is, I use the quarter of the initiation of investigations for the targeted
products to impute the counter-factual time of the investigations for the closely-related
products. Based on this, I can define “leads” and “lags” of the investigations for both
treated and control groups. The terms Ld,allpt (i.e., investigation time fixed effects)
sweep out the differences of various investigation time. Intuitively, these leads and
lags address the concern that product and quarter fixed effects may not fully account
for product specific trends.8 Indeed, I find that the set of leads and lags Ld,allpt has
substantial predictive power for phenomenons like trade deflection.
For the antidumping measures examined in this paper, I identify the investigation
7Specifically, if there is no export reported of product p in the quarter t, I fill it with 0. I follow
the usual practice of adding one unit to all export flows before taking logarithms.
8In the standard DID estimator, treatment occurs at only one point in time and the regression
includes a Treated dummy and Treated × Post dummy. The standard DID specification is
ypt = αTreatedp + β
AllPostt + β
Real(Treated× Post)pt + εpt
In my setting, where antidumping investigations are scattered over time, Lallpt plays a role analogous
to the Post dummy and Ddp,t±τ plays a role analogous to Treated × Post dummy.
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time t as the initiation time of the antidumping investigation, as opposed to the time
the final measure was imposed. This is motivated by prior research which has shown
that antidumping investigations, regardless of the final decison, can have significant
effects on trade (Staiger et al., 1994). The reference period is one quarter before the
investigation so that all other treatment effects are expressed relative to the omitted
period. As illustrated in Section 2, an antidumping investigation usually takes 280-420
days. Therefore, τ = 0 − 3 represents the antidumping investigation process, while
τ = 4 is when the final duty is possibly levied. On the one hand, the coefficients β−9
. . . β−2 show whether the treatment and control groups have common trends before
the antidumping measures. If so, these coefficients should be jointly insignificant. On
the other hand, the coefficients β0 . . . β9 show whether the treatment effect fades out,
stays constant, or even increases over time.
With this empirical specification at hand, I first assess the trade destruction effect
caused by antidumping measures in the US market. That is, I estimate how these
measures destroy the trade of the targeted products from China to the US. However,
the export restrictions to the US can give rise to trade deflection, where a destruction
effect at the product level could be offset by an increase in product-level export to
other countries. Specifically, I investigate whether the US import constraints impose
externalities on Chinese exports, which result in surging of the targeted products to
alternative markets.
3.3.2 Firm-level Framework
The preceding subsection focuses on the effects of antidumping measures on ag-
gregate trade. But an important and related question remains whether these trade
restrictions alter individual firms’ behavior. I therefore analyze how firms’ export
patterns (whether or not to export, and how much to export) and pricing strategy
change when faced with antidumping duties. More importantly, I examine whether
these trade shocks lead to the reallocation of activities across products and destina-
tions within multi-product firms. To put it differently, I ask whether tightened trade
policy against one product within a firm spills over to other products and markets.
By focusing on the adjustments within firms, I aim to measure the myriad effects of
antidumping duties on trade.
Figure 3.1 provides a graphical explanation of multi-product firms in my analysis.
The punished firm is defined as an exporter of multiple 6-digit HS products both to
the US and the RoW, where at least one of its products exporting to the US is subject
to an antidumping duty in the US. In other words, every punished firm has direct
experience of a tariff hike for a product in the US market. The unpunished firm refers
to an exporter of a set of 6-digit products that do not face any antidumping duty
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anywhere in the world. Products A and B are closely-related to each other, as they
belong to the same 4-digit HS product category, but only product A is subject to an
antidumping duty in the US.
Figure 3.1: Product and market structure of multi-product firms
I again follow Autor (2003) and identify the dynamic effect of antidumping measures




















fpt = τ) + ε
d
fpt, (3.3.2)
where the subscripts f , p, d and t denote firm, 6-digit HS product line, destination
market and year, respectively. Notably, I aggregate the data at the annual level as
most firms do not export a given product to a given market in every quarter.
My dependent variables are: (i) a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm exports
a 6-digit HS product to a market in year t (0 otherwise).9 This variable explores the
extensive margin of trade, i.e., a firm’s decision to participate in exporting to a certain
market for a given product. The other dependent variables are: (ii) a firm’s export
values and quantities (in logs) in a market, where zero trade flows are retained from
9If we observe positive exports by a firm in year t but no export after that, we keep the zero
observations in years t− 1 and t+ 1.
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the analysis; and (iii) the price of exported goods (in logs) in that market, proxied by
unit values.
The explanatory variables are similar to equation (3.3.1). The coefficients of interest
are βτ , which measure the average difference between the control and treatment groups.
The focal year t is the initiation year of the investigation, as opposed to the year that
the final measure was actually imposed, though frequently they will be the same.
Since a year dummy must be omitted, I follow the standard procedure of omitting the
first year immediately preceding the investigation. In addition to year fixed effects, I
include a set of firm-product fixed effects (λdfp) to control for firm-product specific and
time-invariant unobserved characteristics which might affect the trade performance of
exporters. More importantly, I include a set of leads and lags around the investigation
year that is common to both the punished and unpunished firms at the firm-product
level (Ld,allfpt ).
Of particular note, both the extensive- and intensive margins effects are com-
pounded by the entry and exit of exporters at the product level. That is, I have
included exporters that exit the exporting markets for the pre-investigation period and
the new entrants into exporting for the post-investigation period. Nevertheless, I con-
centrate on the surviving exporters and the exiters at the firm level.10 That is, I drop
the firms that enter the exporting market after the policy change.
The data exhibit a substantial fraction of zeros at the firm-product-destination-
year level, which represent over 50% of trade values and quantities. There may be two
reasons for the zero trade flows: there truly is no bilateral trade, or bilateral trade
values are not reported.11 If I take the logarithm of the value or quantity of trade and
use an OLS-based estimation methodology, all observations with zero trade flows would
drop out of my estimation sample. This would likely create a bias in my estimated
policy impact: if antidumping measures were prohibitive and caused Chinese exporters
to completely stop exporting the product, then I would likely underestimate the true
effect.
For this reason, I choose to include the zero observations by adding 1 to all export
values and volumes before taking logs, s0 that the actual dependent variable is ln(1 +
EXP). This is a standard approach in the literature if one does not want to drop
zero trade observations. As discussed in Head and Mayer (2014), there are some more
sophisticated methods to deal with zeros, e.g. Poisson Pseudo ML estimation or Tobit
regression, but these approaches come at the expense of losing the ability introduce
10More precisely, surviving exporters are the firms that export at least once both before and after
the policy shock. The exiters refer to firms that stop exporting completely after the policy shock.
11Zero trade and missing trade values are typically not satisfactorily distinguishable in trade ma-
trices.
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controls. In my case, with the three sets of fixed effects, these methods are not possible
without dropping the vast majority of controls.
Trade Destruction
Starting from equation 3.3.2, I first estimate the direct effect of how antidumping
measures suppress trade on Chinese firms. Especially, the often very high tariff rates
can imply substantial distortions, which lead to suboptimal use of scarce resources.
Figure 3.2: Trade destruction in the US at the firm-product level
Figure 3.2 provides a representation of the treatment and control groups for this
analysis. The treatment group refers to firms exporting to the US a 6-digit HS product
that is subject to an antidumping duty in the US. The control group consists of firm-
product-destination triplets that do not face any antidumping duty anywhere in the
world. The products in the control group include all the uninvestigated products
within the 4-digit HS product category to which the targeted products belong. I do so
to investigate the extent to which antidumping actions eliminate trade altogether both
from the extensive and intensive margins.
Trade Deflection
As exporting to the US becomes tougher, firms may reallocate their exports to
other existing markets or start a new trade relationship, or engage in both activities
simultaneously to compensate their losses in the US market. Hence, I examine whether
the US antidumping measures have caused Chinese firms to deflect trade, resulting in
an increase in the exports of the targeted products to third (non-US) markets. Here, I
compare the export performances in non-US markets of firms that have been directly
exposed to the trade restrictions to that of non-exposed firms.
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Figure 3.3: Trade deflection to the RoW at the firm-product level
Figure 3.3 outlines my comparison. Firm 1 the punished firm, which is hit with an
antidumping duty as it exports the US antidumping targeted product A to the US. By
contrast, Firm 2 is the unpunished firm, which is not hit with this tariff increase in
the US because it exports product B, which is not subject to any antidumping duty
anywhere in the world. I am interested in whether the restricted exporters increase
their exports of the targeted products to other unrestricted third markets following the
US export restrictions. The objective of this exercise is to investigate whether the use
of antidumping measures has unintended consequences on trade that go beyond the
affected partners.
Within-Firm Product Switching
To further enhance our understanding of antidumping measures, and in particu-
lar of how US antidumping measures against China spill over across products and
markets within firms, I explore whether an antidumping action against one product
influences firms’ behavior (participation, value, volume shipped and price strategy) for
other products both to the US and the RoW. Specifically, I consider that antidumping
measures can have externalities that spread to other products within firms. Figure 3.4
illustrates this problem. Firm 1 is an antidumping-punished firm because it exports
product A to the US, which is subject to an antidumping duty. I investigate the export
pattern of Firm A’s closely-related product B both to the US and the RoW, to see
whether a tariff hike for one product within a firm affects its export performance for
other products.
In other words, I am concerned with the impact of the spread of antidumping
measures on trade beyond the targeted products within firms. Previous research has
largely neglected the externality effect that antidumping measures may have on other
products than just the targeted ones. Therefore, testing for the presence of spillover
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effects to other product categories allows me to quantify the true costs of antidumping
measures on the restricted exporters.
Figure 3.4: Within-firm product switching behavior to the US/RoW
3.4 Data
I employ data from the following sources: the Global Antidumping Database (Bown,
2015) and Chinese customs data between 2000 and 2006.12
The antidumping data come from the Global Antidumping Database (GAD) of the
World Bank. They cover all antidumping cases by all user countries in the world,
with each investigation mapped to the targeted HS codes from 1980 to 2014. For each
antidumping case, the GAD includes detailed product information (classified at the
10-digit HS level), the initiation date, the preliminary and final determination dates
and decisions, along with the final remedy. I focus on all the antidumping proceedings
carried out by the US against China between 2000 and 2006. I aggregate these products
from the 10-digit to the 6-digit HS level.
The Chinese firms’ cross-border transaction-level data are obtained from China’s
General Administration of Customs. It records monthly import and export transactions
of all Chinese firms with universal trading partners from 2000 to 2006. Each trade is
recorded at the Chinese 8-digit HS level13 with a quantity, a value, and a unit value
as the ratio of the shipment value to quantity. Quantity is measured by one of twelve
different units of measurement (such as kilograms, square meters, et cetera). Values
and unit values are in current US dollar.
12I thank Nankai University for providing the data.
13The number of distinct product codes in the Chinese 8-digit HS classification is comparable to
that in the 10-digit HS trade data for the US (Manova and Yu, 2016).
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At the product-level, I aggregate the monthly customs data to the quarterly level
in order to avoid the noise that characterizes monthly data, and hence to have more
precise estimates. More importantly, this allows me to avoid some of the partial year
biases present in annual data as discussed by Bernard et al. (2017). I also aggregate
export products from the 8-digit to the 6-digit HS level.14 I then match Chinese
transaction-level data with US antidumping investigations against China, at the 6-
digit HS level. It is the most disaggregated product category that is internationally
comparable. Appendix table 3.7 presents means and standard deviations for the main
variables of interest in my sample of product-quarter observations. On average, targeted
products have higher export volumes and a larger number of exporters.
At the firm level, I aggregate the monthly customs data to the annual level as most
firms do not export a given product to a given market in every month or quarter. This
also allows me to avoid the seasonality and lumpiness typical of monthly data. By
focusing on annual data, I abstract from these issues and related concerns with sticky
prices.
Figure 3.5: US antidumping investigations against China and the Rest of the World
Note: Elaboration based on the World Bank Global Antidumping Database from 2000 to 2006. The figure considers
all antidumping investigations launched by the US against third-countries products. The share of Chinese products
measured as the ratio between number of US investigations against Chinese products and the total number of US
antidumping proceedings against third-countries imports.
There are a total of 47 US antidumping cases against China between 2000 and
14The HS codes underwent a major revision in 2002, and I adopt the 6-digit HS 1996 codes main-
tained by the World Customs Organization and use the conversion table from UN Comtrade to convert
the HS 2002 codes into the HS 1996 codes, to ensure the consistency of the product categorization
over time (2000-2006).
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2006, which cover 147 unique products at the 6-digit HS level. Among the investigated
products, 77 products ended up with final affirmative determinations, and antidumping
duties were imposed on them. In addition, 49 products had affirmative preliminary
ITC determinations but received negative final ITC determinations; 2 products were
withdrawn before the final ITC determination. The rest of the 15 products either
withdrew or were given negative decisions at the preliminary ITC stage. Figure 3.5
shows that the number of products is investigated for dumping by the US has decreased
over time. However, the ratio of Chinese products which have been investigated is
consistently high. Table 3.8, in the Appendix, lists the antidumping cases and related
products that are covered in this paper. Figure 3.9, in the Appendix, illustrates the
number of US antidumping initiations against China by year and the ratio of affirmative
decisions.
The matched panel data from 2000 to 2006 contain 13,821 product-year-destination
level observations and 1,213,138 firm-product-year-destination level observations. This
level of disaggregation allows me to study within-firm adjustments at both the extensive
and intensive margins of trade. I have 343 products at the 6-digit HS level in the
matched data, with 77 of these products subject to antidumping duties.
3.5 Empirical Results
3.5.1 Product-level Trade Destruction
Before turning to the estimates of equation (3.3.1), I provide a visual summary of
the time trend of export values for treated and control products at quarterly intervals
spanning from four years prior to four years after the antidumping investigations. The
vertical line marks the date of initiation of the investigations. This figure provides
initial evidence that antidumping measures do affect the export values. First, there is
an upward trend in the export values for both groups before the investigation. Secondly,
it seems that before the investigation, the treatment and control groups do not exhibit
differential time trend, indicating that the pre-existing trends are similar for both
groups. Thirdly, antidumping measures have a clearly dampening effect on the export
values of the products in the treatment group.
In table 3.1, I systematically investigate the extent to which antidumping measures
destruct trade. All regressions reported in this table include quarter fixed effects,
product fixed effects and investigation time fixed effects. Also, note that in this table
and all following tables, the method of handling zeros in the estimation has been to
use a functional form that adds 1 to all zeros before taking logrithms.
In column (1), the dependent variable is export participation in the US market.
The coefficients (β−9 . . . β−2) are close to zero and jointly insignificant, indicating that
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the DID common trends assumption is satisfied. Moreover, it shows that antidumping
measures are associated with a modest but meaningful reduction in the probability of
a product being exported to the US. Specifically, I find that the antidumping-targeted
products are approximately 10-16 percentage points less likely to be exported from the
date of final antidumping duties is levied till the end of the sample.
Figure 3.6: Time trend of product-level export values to the US
Column (2) shows a further extensive-margin estimation, in which I test the effect
on the number of exporters in every product-destination-year cell. The number of
firms exporting the targeted products during the investigation process is between 10%
to 27% smaller than prior to the investigations.15 Then, the presence of antidumping
measures averagely reduces the total number of firms serving the US market by about
30% after the investigation. Antidumping measures hence not only are associated with
an adverse effect on the likelihood of products being exported but also result in a
drastic decrease in the number of exporters.
Column (3) replaces the dependent variable by the log of export values. Again, The
estimated coefficients of the treatment leads in this column are close to zero, showing
little evidence of an anticipatory response for the products subject to antidumping
duties. Nevertheless, a strong pattern emerges during the investigation: export values
decline by 48% to 88%. They continue to decline untill the end of the sample period.
Notably, this analysis encompasses the possibility that targeted products completely
stop being exported to the US, as I include zero-export observations. Considering that
15The exact percentage difference in the predicted y when Dp,t = 1 versus when Dp,t = 0 is
%4y = 100× (eβ − 1).
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Table 3.1: Trade destruction effect on the US at the product level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Years relative to Participation log of log of log of log of
investigation dummy # of exporters export value export volume export price
9 or More Quarters Before 0.048 -0.125 -0.044 -0.103 -0.258∗
(0.063) (0.116) (0.728) (0.753) (0.154)
8 Quarters Prior 0.022 -0.060 0.054 0.087 -0.309∗
(0.054) (0.082) (0.593) (0.604) (0.160)
7 Quarters Prior -0.008 -0.060 -0.044 -0.249 -0.191
(0.056) (0.069) (0.631) (0.663) (0.187)
6 Quarters Prior 0.016 0.025 0.165 0.013 -0.084
(0.054) (0.072) (0.618) (0.645) (0.187)
5 Quarters Prior 0.043 -0.001 0.431 0.307 -0.107
(0.055) (0.068) (0.622) (0.662) (0.162)
4 Quarters Prior 0.027 -0.025 0.386 0.072 0.020
(0.055) (0.071) (0.622) (0.636) (0.169)
3 Quarters Prior 0.028 -0.046 0.344 0.385 -0.127
(0.045) (0.049) (0.501) (0.542) (0.147)
2 Quarters Prior 0.016 0.040 0.284 0.237 0.009
(0.044) (0.038) (0.443) (0.485) (0.138)
Investigation Starts 0.007 -0.064 -0.027 -0.164 0.059
(0.041) (0.048) (0.435) (0.469) (0.127)
1 Quarter After 0.025 -0.094∗ 0.008 0.048 -0.158
(0.049) (0.055) (0.491) (0.528) (0.177)
2 Quarters After 0.006 -0.157∗∗ -0.655 -0.724 -0.151
(0.055) (0.074) (0.578) (0.645) (0.147)
3 Quarters After -0.078 -0.271∗∗∗ -1.504∗∗ -1.658∗∗ -0.253
(0.053) (0.076) (0.603) (0.676) (0.170)
4 Quarters After -0.094∗ -0.309∗∗∗ -1.868∗∗∗ -2.024∗∗∗ -0.133
(0.052) (0.083) (0.603) (0.681) (0.182)
5 Quarters After -0.127∗∗ -0.334∗∗∗ -2.084∗∗∗ -2.129∗∗∗ -0.386∗∗
(0.058) (0.085) (0.691) (0.778) (0.189)
6 Quarters After -0.148∗∗ -0.388∗∗∗ -2.268∗∗∗ -2.523∗∗∗ -0.087
(0.058) (0.088) (0.698) (0.767) (0.158)
7 Quarters After -0.137∗∗ -0.374∗∗∗ -2.516∗∗∗ -2.556∗∗∗ -0.109
(0.055) (0.091) (0.625) (0.678) (0.247)
8 Quarters After -0.164∗∗∗ -0.355∗∗∗ -2.545∗∗∗ -2.843∗∗∗ 0.043
(0.058) (0.103) (0.695) (0.772) (0.225)
9 or More Quarters After -0.098∗ -0.447∗∗∗ -2.217∗∗∗ -2.285∗∗∗ -0.193
(0.057) (0.104) (0.718) (0.791) (0.176)
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Investigation Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,340 8,340 8,340 8,340 5,802
Adjusted R2 0.568 0.950 0.764 0.731 0.717
Standard errors clustered at the product level in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
the antidumping duties imposed by the US on Chinese products often have exceeded
100% ad valorem, it is not surprising that targeted products are unable to continue
to be exported. The subsequent column repeats these estimates using the log of ex-
port quantities as the dependent variable. The pattern of coefficients, in this case,
is very similar to column (3), providing robust evidence that antidumping measures
substantially destroy trade from China to the US.
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Column (5) documents how antidumping measures affect export prices, proxied
by the unit values at the 6-digit HS level. Export prices are remarkably stable over
time, despite the antidumping measures that the products are subject to. However,
this estimation may suffer from measurement error, as the unit values I calculate may
be polluted by aggregation across firms. More importantly, it suggests the bulk of
antidumping effect represents a quantity decrease.
Taken together, these estimates suggest that US antidumping measures consider-
ably eliminate trade of the targeted products from China to the US. Tthe targeted
products less likely to be exported and there is a sharp decline in the number of ex-
porters.
As highlighted in Bertrand et al. (2004), a multiple-period DID specification may
suffer from serial correlation in the dependent variable (such as export values and
quantities), which lead to over-rejection of the null hypothesis. One way to overcome
the issue is to aggregate the data into two periods: pre- and post-intervention. I
therefore adopt this remedy as a robustness check. Table 3.9 in the appendix shows the
results with a single indicator that equals 1 following the initiation of the antidumping
investigations. The estimates confirm that the imposition of US import restrictions
negatively affects both the extensive and intensive margins of trade.
3.5.2 Product-level Trade Deflection
I have shown that antidumping measures have caused significant reductions in ex-
ports from China to the US. From a policy perspective, it is important to know whether
the US use of antidumping measures against China imposes unintended consequences
on unrestricted third markets, such as leading to an increase of the targeted products
from China to alternative markets. My formal econometric estimates, presented in
table 3.2, indicate no trade deflection. Perhaps more surprisingly, I find that the US
antidumping restrictions result in Chinese exports neither surging nor falling to third
markets.
Specifically, table 3.2 reports five specifications that use the export participation
dummy to the RoW (column 1); the number of Chinese exporters serving the RoW
(column 2); the export values, quantities and prices of the targeted products to the
RoW (columns 3-5). Across specifications, we observe no pre-trending for any of the
outcome variables, which lends credibility of the research design. Moreover, what is
striking is that we do not detect any changes in the export of the targeted products
from China to third markets, as in no case are these variables significant. That is,
rather than any trade-reducing or trade-increasing effects, the US import constraints
are associated with no effect on China’s exports to alternative markets. To put it
differently, trade policy changes in one market do not affect the evolution of trade
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among other countries, where the policy does not change.
These findings seem to be inconsistent with existing empirical evidence (e.g. Bown
and Crowley, 2007, 2010), which finds that antidumping measures spill over to other
markets, regardless of whether these trade-reducing measures promote or distort trade
in third markets. These conflicting results are attributed to the inclusion of Ld,allpt
in the empirical specification. The current practice in the literature with a setting
similar to mine, for instance, Crowley et al. (2018) and Lu et al. (2013), is to use
specifications including product and year fixed effects only, without including Ld,allpt .
However, as I explained at length before, treatment occurs at only one point time in
standard DID estimator, whereas in my setting, the investigations are staggered over
time, Ld,allpt hence plays a role analogous to Post dummy that is common to both the
treatment and control groups. To check whether a set of Ld,allpt is useful on the outcome
variables, I also test their joint significances. The p-values are extremely small in all
cases, showing that controlling for various investigation times is important to avoid
bias, even year, product fixed effects are included. Had I not included Ld,allpt , I would
have obtained the results that antidumping measures have negative externalities on
the trade that spread to third markets at the product level.16 That is, I would have
wrongly concluded that these measures not only cause a considerable decline in the
number of Chinese exporters serving alternative markets but also lead to a sizable
reduction in export flows of the targeted products from China to the RoW.
In sum, I find that the imposition of US antidumping measures against China does
not affect its exports to alternative markets. This finding seems to run counter to
the argument that the change in US trade policy would push China’s exports to other
countries. To this end, my result questions the justification of the threat of China’s
export capacity to undermine and distort well-established world trade patterns.
In a robustness check, I again collapse the data into pre- and post-investigation
periods to avoid the serial correlation problem in a multiple-period DID specifications.
The results are presented in Table 3.10, which confirm that antidumping measures do
not have externalities on aggregate trade to other markets.
16These results are available upon request.
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Table 3.2: Trade deflection effect on the RoW at the product level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Years relative to Participation log of log of log of log of
investigation dummy # of exporters export value export volume export price
9 or More Quarters Before 0.047 0.266∗ 0.749 0.615 0.033
(0.045) (0.137) (0.610) (0.617) (0.066)
8 Quarters Prior 0.001 0.174∗∗ 0.155 0.062 0.098
(0.017) (0.082) (0.259) (0.270) (0.076)
7 Quarters Prior 0.005 0.102 0.034 -0.033 0.079
(0.017) (0.070) (0.228) (0.235) (0.061)
6 Quarters Prior -0.025∗ 0.080 -0.231 -0.256 0.058
(0.015) (0.067) (0.235) (0.235) (0.052)
5 Quarters Prior 0.003 0.093 0.085 0.023 0.044
(0.016) (0.067) (0.217) (0.223) (0.054)
4 Quarters Prior 0.010 0.051 0.036 -0.005 0.046
(0.017) (0.069) (0.211) (0.215) (0.049)
3 Quarters Prior -0.010 0.078 -0.052 -0.149 0.116
(0.020) (0.052) (0.236) (0.284) (0.100)
2 Quarters Prior 0.004 0.008 0.072 0.069 0.013
(0.014) (0.043) (0.140) (0.150) (0.048)
Investigation Starts -0.008 0.096∗∗ -0.192 -0.141 -0.003
(0.013) (0.045) (0.175) (0.174) (0.038)
1 Quarter After 0.026∗ 0.029 -0.013 0.031 -0.034
(0.016) (0.057) (0.250) (0.251) (0.055)
2 Quarters After 0.013 0.069 0.099 0.099 0.012
(0.014) (0.058) (0.239) (0.237) (0.046)
3 Quarters After 0.027 0.091 0.183 0.086 0.109∗∗
(0.019) (0.064) (0.244) (0.241) (0.047)
4 Quarters After 0.011 0.112∗ 0.007 -0.067 0.057
(0.020) (0.060) (0.281) (0.285) (0.050)
5 Quarters After -0.007 0.090 -0.304 -0.337 0.044
(0.025) (0.056) (0.319) (0.332) (0.054)
6 Quarters After -0.006 0.029 -0.248 -0.211 -0.018
(0.024) (0.063) (0.309) (0.315) (0.059)
7 Quarters After -0.047∗ 0.022 -0.489 -0.531 0.076
(0.026) (0.076) (0.328) (0.331) (0.063)
8 Quarters After -0.026 -0.012 -0.392 -0.418 0.046
(0.021) (0.080) (0.288) (0.290) (0.056)
9 or More Quarters After -0.030∗ 0.151∗ -0.219 -0.290 0.111∗
(0.017) (0.084) (0.234) (0.240) (0.065)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Investigation Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8340 8340 8340 8340 8019
Adjusted R2 0.263 0.937 0.705 0.735 0.936
Standard errors clustered at the product level in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.5.3 Firm-level Trade Destruction
After documenting the effects of antidumping measures on trade at the product
level, I now look at export adjustments within firms to reveal the possible channels
driving the effects at the aggregate level. In this subsection, I investigate how these
measures distort export patterns of Chinese firms in the US market. All the regres-
sions reported in table 3.3 and all the following tables include year, firm-product and
investigation time fixed effects.
The first column explores the impact of antidumping measures on export partici-
pation. Because of the firm-product fixed effects, the coefficients are identified out of
firm-product pairs that either stopped exporting to the US following the investigation
or sold in the US at least once before and after the investigation. The estimates in-
dicate that the likelihood of participation in export activity to the US is about 2.7 to
6.8 percentage points lower among the punished firms after the investigations.
Table 3.3: Trade destruction effect on the US at the firm level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years relative to Participation log of log of log of
investigation dummy export value export volume export price
4 or More Years Before -0.023 -0.134 -0.203 0.035
(0.039) (0.326) (0.249) (0.041)
3 Years Before -0.022 -0.217 -0.276∗ 0.072
(0.020) (0.191) (0.154) (0.055)
2 Years Before -0.011 -0.107 -0.139 0.042
(0.011) (0.101) (0.087) (0.028)
Investigation Starts -0.011 -0.129 -0.083 0.046∗∗
(0.012) (0.119) (0.104) (0.019)
1 Years After -0.027∗∗ -0.213 -0.147 0.041∗∗
(0.014) (0.139) (0.113) (0.019)
2 Years After -0.046∗∗ -0.427∗∗ -0.357∗∗ 0.068∗∗
(0.019) (0.197) (0.163) (0.032)
3 Years After -0.102∗∗∗ -0.852∗∗∗ -0.681∗∗∗ 0.077∗
(0.026) (0.257) (0.210) (0.044)
4 or More Years After -0.068∗∗∗ -0.482∗∗∗ -0.451∗∗∗ 0.117
(0.020) (0.176) (0.160) (0.077)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Investigation Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 271,848 271,848 271,848 85,010
Adjusted R2 0.092 0.244 0.263 0.863
Standard errors clustered at the product level in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The following two columns present the results on how firm-level export flows to
the US are affected by the US import restraints. First, both of them show that pre-
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treatment trends do not differ between treatment and control groups, which is con-
sistent with causal interpretations. Also, column (3) reveals that firms exporting the
targeted products to the US experience a sizable decline in export volumes, approxi-
mately ranging from 20% to 40% four years after the investigation. These estimated
effects include both a reduction in exports and a complete stop in trade. In other
words, antidumping measures may not only result in a significant decrease in export
flows among survivors but also lead firms to cease exporting. Taking into account the
fact that the size of antidumping duties imposed on China has consistently exceeded
100%, it is entirely understandable that many firms are unable to continue to export
to the US.
In column (5), I find that the presence of antidumping measures raises export prices
by 5% to 10% for surviving firms. Tthis result may look odd since firms do not have
a incentive to change their price: since the US treats China as a non-market economy,
the fair market value is determined from a surrogate country and the domestic price
is irrelevant for the calculation of the dumping margin. However, this is not the entire
story. Let me first stress that most survivors are assigned firm-specific antidumping
duties, which are much lower than the industry-wide ones and are similar to those
eligible to market economy companies, on average (see Figure 3.8 in the Appendix).
Furthermore, antidumping duties are reviewed on an annual basis and are often revised.
For Chinese firms have ever assigned for individual rates, they have strong incentives to
raise their prices in an attempt to maintain the low antidumping duties.17 Therefore,
we observe price increases. In addition, when we compare the columns, it becomes
clear that antidumping duties have a more significant impact on quantities than on
prices.
Adding the investigation time dummies explicitly accounts for various treatment
times that could potentially induce bias. Indeed, I find that these variables exert
a jointly significant (at 1% level) impact on firm-level export patterns. Combining
the findings in Table 3.1 and 3.3, we see that an increase in export costs (i.e., the
imposition of antidumping duties) translates into lower exports through a decrease in
export probability, and a decline in the number of exporters. It is also associated with
reductions in export flows from survivors.
3.5.4 Firm-level Trade Deflection
Do US antidumping measures lead to the punished firms deflecting the targeted
products from China to non-US markets? Table 3.4 presents the estimation results
where the control group is the unpunished firms exporting closely-related products to
17That is, by raising the prices, the targeted firms’ dumping margin falls, and hence the duty can
fall.
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the RoW. Overall, we conclude that Chinese firms which are exposed to the disruption
of the US market do not deflect trade to other markets. On the contrary, I find that
the US import constraints are associated with a chilling effect on the exports of the
punished Chinese firms to alternative markets.
Specifically, column (1) concerns the firms’ participation in export markets. We
observe that the US-imposed antidumping duty on product p hurts the probability to
export to the RoW by a punished firm. The estimated leads show that there are no pre-
trends before the investigation. In the years after the investigation, an antidumping-
punished firm is between 1.2 to 7 percentage points less likely to export the targeted
products to the RoW.
Table 3.4: Trade deflection effect on the RoW at the firm level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time relative to Participation log of log of log of
investigation dummy export value export volume export price
4 or More Years Before -0.037 -0.314 -0.380 0.029
(0.033) (0.300) (0.259) (0.052)
3 Years Before -0.027 -0.243 -0.300∗∗ 0.048∗∗
(0.017) (0.154) (0.137) (0.023)
2 Years Before -0.020∗∗ -0.164∗∗ -0.192∗∗ 0.021
(0.009) (0.078) (0.078) (0.016)
Investigation Starts -0.006 -0.020 0.035 0.027∗∗
(0.011) (0.105) (0.106) (0.011)
1 Year After -0.012 -0.025 0.025 0.033∗
(0.013) (0.123) (0.118) (0.017)
2 Years After -0.041∗∗∗ -0.267∗∗ -0.208∗ 0.049∗∗
(0.014) (0.131) (0.120) (0.021)
3 Years After -0.075∗∗∗ -0.482∗∗∗ -0.391∗∗∗ 0.053∗
(0.015) (0.129) (0.122) (0.030)
4 or More Years After -0.067∗∗∗ -0.309∗ -0.296∗ 0.086∗∗
(0.023) (0.172) (0.179) (0.039)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Investigation Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 762,448 762,448 762,448 258,886
Adjusted R2 0.108 0.256 0.278 0.854
Standard errors clustered at the product level in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Columns (2) and (3) report analogous results for firms’ export values and quanti-
ties. These estimates show that firms restrain their export flows to alternative markets
in which they have established trade relations. Specifically, in years 1 through 4 fol-
lowing the investigations, the export values of the targeted products to the RoW from
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punished firms are reduced approximately by 33% - 37%. In column (4), I analyze
the evolution of unit values to check whether prices have changed. The estimated
coefficients are positive and significant for all years following the trade policy shock.
Moreover, the price coefficients grow significantly over time, from 2.7% to 8.6%. Ulti-
mately, antidumping shocks create negative spillovers and have harmful effects on the
ability of the punished firms to export the targeted products to other destinations.
I interpret these findings as evidence of the impact of trade policy uncertainty on
exporters. Recent contributions (Handley, 2014; Pierce and Schott, 2016; Handley and
Limão, 2017) have shown that uncertainty over future trade policy has a real effect on
international trade. The imposition of antidumping duties in the US is identified as a
signal of rising trade policy uncertainty for the same product in other countries. That
is, Chinese exporters are deterred by the US trade measures and may fear that tariff
hikes for the same products would spread to other countries. Consequently, they choose
to slow down their export expansion in these products to third markets. Therefore, we
observe that surviving firms not only reduce shipments but also increase prices.
These findings are relevant to policy-makers. One implication is that the punished
face an additional cost of antidumping, as they are not able to deflect trade and recoup
the losses. This suggests that antidumping measures incur collateral damage and are
even more detrimental to the punished firms in developing countries like China than
previously assumed. Although the aggregate exports of the targeted products from
China to the RoW were mostly unaffected, because of the entry of new exporters, they
indeed exert a significant adverse effects on survivors.
3.5.5 Within-firm Product Switching
It is perfectly plausible that a trade restriction against one line of goods from a given
exporter, f , could effect the exports of other goods from the same firm. That is, the
breadth or extent of antidumping measures may go beyond the targeted products. In
this section, I examine whether an antidumping measure against one product influences
firms’ export decisions for other products both to the US and the RoW. I first focus
on how firms reshuffle their export activities across products to the US market.
Column 1 of table 3.5 displays the result of a basic linear probability specification.
I find that the probability of exporting any closely-related products is about 2.3 to
8.0 percentage points lower among the punished firms. The dependent variables in
columns (2) and (3) of are firms’ export values and quantities of closely-related products
to the US. Again, the inclusion of zeros implies that I compound both the surviving
exporters and exiters, rather than pure intensive margin. The estimates show that
the limitations on trade with the US negatively affect the trade flows of the closely-
related products. Firms that were hit with these trade restraints reduce their exports
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of unaffected products to the US by about 25% to 48%. These measures are also
associated with price increase. In the years immediately following the investigation,
the prices of the closely-related products from the punished firms go up by about 5%
to 10%.
Table 3.5: Within-firm product switching to the US
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years relative to Participation log of log of log of
investigation dummy export value export volume export price
4 or More Years Before 0.012 0.247 0.164 0.054∗
(0.023) (0.194) (0.146) (0.031)
3 Years Before 0.005 0.084 0.038 0.036
(0.014) (0.144) (0.106) (0.033)
2 Years Before 0.008 0.101 0.049 0.026
(0.010) (0.094) (0.079) (0.028)
Investigation Starts -0.023 -0.282∗ -0.244∗ 0.050∗
(0.015) (0.145) (0.125) (0.030)
1 Year After -0.015 -0.165∗ -0.119 0.064∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.097) (0.077) (0.024)
2 Years After -0.039∗∗ -0.431∗∗∗ -0.382∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.153) (0.131) (0.035)
3 Years After -0.096∗∗∗ -0.893∗∗∗ -0.742∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗
(0.024) (0.236) (0.193) (0.040)
4 or More Years After -0.079∗∗∗ -0.639∗∗∗ -0.588∗∗∗ 0.077
(0.021) (0.242) (0.201) (0.078)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Investigation Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 321,075 321,075 321,075 93,645
Adjusted R2 0.062 0.201 0.211 0.851
Standard errors clustered at the product level in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In sum, table 3.5 shows that the use of antidumping measures on one set of products
against a firm reduces the trade flows of other unaffected products from the same firm
to the initiation country. That is, antidumping measures generate a deterrent effect
on firms, leading them to reduce shipments of the closely-related products to the US.
The antidumping-punished firms may “learn” how to avoid dumping complaints by
lowering the value or volume, and raising the price. In other words, antidumping
measures generate negative spillovers on trade beyond the targeted products within
firms. Moreover, combining the findings in table 3.3, we can conclude that an increase
in the export cost of serving one market leads firms to downsize all their exports in that
market. These results can also be interpreted in light of the literature on heterogeneous
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firms and costs of trade (Melitz, 2003). Chinese exporters who may not recover the
export costs required to service the US market reduce the exports both on the targeted
and the closely-related products.
To complete the analysis of the effects of US antidumping measures on Chinese
firms, I examine whether trade shifts to other products and other destinations of a
punished firm. In column (1) of table 3.6, the dependent variable is a dummy variable
that equals 1 if a firm exports an unaffected 6-digit HS product to the RoW in year t
and 0 otherwise. The estimated coefficients for treatment leads are jointly significant
at the conventional levels. This result suggests that the treatment and control groups
do not have parallel trends before antidumping measures. Therefore, one might worry
that they might differ in unobservable ways that invalidate the estimates.
Proceeding across specifications, in column (2) I redefine the dependent variable
by a firm’s export value of unaffected products to the RoW. The estimates show that
the US antidumping measures have a dampening effect on the exports of closely-related
products to alternative markets from a punished firm. The joint F-test for the presence
of pre-existing trends is insignificant at the conventional level, suggesting there is no
different trend prior to the investigations. The size of the estimated effect is substan-
tial, exports to alternative markets decline by about 16% to 50% for firms that were
subject to the US trade restrictions. Finally, I examine how firms’ pricing behaviors
are affected. I find that firms facing such policies raise prices of closely-related products
in third-country markets in subsequent years.
These results merit at least two comments. First, the observed lower values and
higher prices indicate a learning effect from the supply side. The more that firms are
subject to such measures, the more likely that they slow down their export expansion
to avoid further investigations. More importantly, combining the findings in table 3.4,
we conclude that the imposition of an antidumping duty on one product within a
firm, as a measure of rising trade policy uncertainty, negatively impacts a firm’s export
decision across products in other markets. These results demonstrate how the country-
product specific nature of antidumping measures imposes externalities on non-targeted
country-product pairs, widening our understanding of the breadth of such measures.
Summarizing the results presented in tables 3.5 and 3.6, I find that antidumping
measures have detrimental effects that spread to other products and markets for the
same punished firms. That is, the US import restrictions imposed on Chinese firms have
resulted in reductions of the exports of the closely-related products across destinations.
A logical implication of my findings is that growing export uncertainty reduce trade and
policy instruments that increase uncertainty, such as antidumping, discourage trade.
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Table 3.6: Within-firm product switching to the RoW
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time relative to Participation log of log of log of
investigation dummy export value export volume export price
4 or More Years Before -0.010 0.021 -0.008 -0.019
(0.012) (0.120) (0.111) (0.023)
3 Years Before -0.017∗∗ -0.122∗ -0.137∗∗ -0.016
(0.007) (0.071) (0.056) (0.015)
2 Years Before -0.008 -0.033 -0.058 -0.011
(0.005) (0.054) (0.044) (0.013)
Investigation Starts -0.018∗∗ -0.168∗∗ -0.108 0.020∗∗
(0.008) (0.079) (0.070) (0.010)
1 Year After -0.017∗∗ -0.149∗∗ -0.078 0.041∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.067) (0.053) (0.013)
2 Years After -0.048∗∗∗ -0.410∗∗∗ -0.324∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.090) (0.071) (0.017)
3 Years After -0.091∗∗∗ -0.700∗∗∗ -0.574∗∗∗ 0.021
(0.009) (0.089) (0.071) (0.017)
4 or More Years After -0.097∗∗∗ -0.673∗∗∗ -0.599∗∗∗ 0.041
(0.013) (0.104) (0.091) (0.030)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Investigation Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,074,867 1,074,867 1,074,867 339,792
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.208 0.219 0.846
Standard errors clustered at the product level in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
3.5.6 Robustness Check
In order to check the sensitivity of my results, I experiment with an alternative
estimation model. In particular, I use a specification with a dummy that equals 1 during
the antidumping measures for the punished firms and another dummy that equals 1
during the antidumping measures for both the punished and unpunished firms at the
firm-product level. The results are presented in tables 3.11 - 3.14 in the Appendix.
These tables show large and statistically significant effects of antidumping measures
for all outcome variables, consistent with the dynamic specifications. This suggests
that the imposition of antidumping duties significantly restrain trade both from the
extensive and intensive margins of trade across products and markets.
3.6 Conclusion
Using rich firm-level Chinese customs data over the period 2000-2006, I examine
how antidumping measures affect product- and firm-level export dynamics. I find
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strong evidence that the US antidumping restrictions reduce Chinese exports to the
US both from the extensive and intensive margins. However, I do not find evidence
that the imposition of such trade restrictions in the US have caused Chinese exports
surging or declining to alternative markets. That is, a trade shock in one market does
not affect the evolution of aggregate exports in another market, where the policy has
not changed.
However, the overall impact of antidumping measures on trade at the product level
hides a very rich set of within-firm adjustments. To uncover the channels through
which exporters are affected, and improve our understanding of how such measures
influence aggregate trade, I further explore their effects at the firm-product level. I
document that Chinese firms that were hit with US antidumping measures decrease
their exports of the targeted products not only to the US but also to alternative markets.
These results imply that antidumping measures create negative externalities that go
beyond the policy-imposing country. More importantly, antidumping measures are
associated with a deterrent effect to other products and destinations within firms. That
is, the exports of uninvestigated products both to the US and to alternative markets
from the punished firms also experience a decline. On the policy front, the results
presented here are worrisome. Because such measures generate a chilling effect on trade
beyond the targeted products within firms, exporters in China face additional costs of
antidumping. Finally, I find compelling evidence of a price increasing effect associated
with antidumping measures within firms. This may suggest that firms increase their
product quality in response to such negative trade shocks, though unit values may not
directly reflect product quality.
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3.7 Appendix
Figure 3.7: Flow Chart of US’ Antidumping Proceedings
81
Table 3.7: Summary Statistics of Products
Before After
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Closely-related Targeted t-Test Closely-related Targeted t-Test
Log (total number 0.505 0.591 -7.912*** 0.500 0.423 7.189***
of exporters) (0.308) (0.246) (0.311) (0.338)
Log (total value 9.942 10.77 -8.552*** 10.23 10.62 -4.613***
of exports) (2.342) (2.303) (2.504) (2.704)
Log (total volumn 9.439 11.01 -13.690*** 9.892 10.83 -9.469***
of exports) (3.005) (2.659) (3.135) (3.054)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 3.8: US antidumping measures against China: average duty per product
Figure 3.9: Antidumping initiations by year
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USA-AD-874 07-Jul-2000 721420 59.98 133
USA-AD-893 06-Oct-2000 210690, 040900, 170290 183.8 183.8









USA-AD-921 01-Mar-2001 481950, 481920 164.75 164.75
USA-AD-932 04-May-2001 940179, 940171 134.77 70.71
USA-AD-986 30-Nov-2001 720292 78.52 66.71
USA-AD-990 27-Feb-2002 730711 55.13 75.5
USA-AD-1010 08-May-2002 730890, 732690 32.73 15.61
USA-AD-1013 18-Jul-2002 292511 363.22 329.04
USA-AD-1014 13-Sep-2002 390530 97.86 7.86
USA-AD-1020 04-Oct-2002 283660 81.3 81.3
USA-AD-1021 06-Nov-2002 730719 146.41 111.36
USA-AD-1022 29-Nov-2002 281810 218.93 135.18
USA-AD-1034 13-May-2003 852812 78.45 78.45
USA-AD-1043 27-Jun-2003 392321 80.52 77.57
USA-AD-1046 30-Jun-2003 293213 31.33 136.86
USA-AD-1047 08-Jul-2003 940320, 940390 153.76 153.76
USA-AD-1058 10-Nov-2003 940350, 700992 198.08 198.08
USA-AD-1059 21-Nov-2003 871680, 871690 346.94 383.6
USA-AD-1060 28-Nov-2003 320417 370.06 217.94
USA-AD-1070a 23-Feb-2004 480439, 481890, 950590
480261, 482390
266.83 266.83





USA-AD-1071 09-Mar-2004 810419, 810430 177.62 141.49
USA-AD-1082 21-May-2004 293369 179.48 285.63
USA-AD-1091 06-Apr-2005 590190 264.09 264.09
USA-AD-1095 19-Sep-2005 482010, 481022, 481190 258.21 258.21
USA-AD-1103 29-Jun-2006 380210 228.11 228.11
USA-AD-1104 29-Jun-2006 550320 44.3 44.3
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To demonstrate the robustness of my baseline estimates, I employ a second speci-
fication with a dummy turning to 1 during the antidumping measures for the targeted
products (AD-EffectsTreated,dpt ) and another dummy turning to 1 during the antidump-
ing measures for both targeted and closely-related products (AD-EffectsAll,dpt ). Under
my identification assumption, βTreated gives the average causal effects of the measures.










Table 3.9: Trade destruction effect on the US at the product level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Years relative to Participation log of log of log of log of
investigation dummy # of exporters export value export volume export price
AD-EffectsTreated -0.107∗∗∗ -0.286∗∗∗ -1.850∗∗∗ -1.880∗∗∗ -0.013
(0.034) (0.081) (0.458) (0.490) (0.104)
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Investigation Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,340 8,340 8,340 8,340 5,802
Adjusted R2 0.559 0.949 0.756 0.722 0.718
Standard errors clustered at the product level in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.10: Trade deflection effect on the RoW at the product level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Years relative to Participation log of log of log of log of
investigation dummy # of exporters export value export volume export price
AD-EffectsTreated -0.027∗ -0.032 -0.417∗ -0.392 0.027
(0.016) (0.071) (0.238) (0.243) (0.050)
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Investigation Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,340 8,340 8,340 8,340 8,019
Adjusted R2 0.242 0.933 0.694 0.724 0.934
Standard errors clustered at the product level in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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To examine the robustness of my findings, I adopt a second specification with a
dummy turning to 1 during the antidumping measures for the punished firms (AD-EffectsTreated,dfpt )
and another dummy turning to 1 during the antidumping measures for both punished
and unpunished firms (AD-EffectsAll,dfpt ) at the firm-product level. Under my identi-
fication assumption, βTreated gives the average causal effects of the measures. The










Table 3.11: Trade destruction effect on the US at the firm level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years relative to Participation log of log of log of
investigation dummy export value export volume export price
AD-EffectsTreated -0.035∗∗ -0.293∗∗ -0.195∗ 0.042∗
(0.015) (0.141) (0.118) (0.022)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Investigation Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 271,848 271,848 271,848 86,975
Adjusted R2 0.090 0.243 0.261 0.864
Standard errors clustered at the product level in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.12: Trade deflection effect on the RoW at the firm level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years relative to Participation log of log of log of
investigation dummy export value export volume export price
AD-EffectsTreated -0.016 -0.047 0.031 0.026∗
(0.011) (0.106) (0.101) (0.015)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Investigation Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 762,448 762,448 762,448 268,649
Adjusted R2 0.106 0.255 0.277 0.855
Standard errors clustered at the product level in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.13: Within-firm product switching to the US
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years relative to Participation log of log of log of
investigation dummy export value export volume export price
AD-EffectsTreated -0.043∗∗∗ -0.455∗∗∗ -0.369∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗
(0.011) (0.107) (0.085) (0.028)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Investigation Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 321,075 321,075 321,075 93,645
Adjusted R2 0.061 0.200 0.210 0.851
Standard errors clustered at the product level in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.14: Within-firm product switching to the RoW
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years relative to Participation log of log of log of
investigation dummy export value export volume export price
AD-EffectsTreated -0.033∗∗∗ -0.289∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.070) (0.055) (0.009)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Investigation Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,074,867 1,074,867 1,074,867 339,792
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.207 0.217 0.846




Antidumping: Evidence from China
Abstract
In this paper, I examine how Chinese multi-product firms adjust their export behavior
following the US antidumping measures. Using Chinese customs data from 2000 to
2006, I provide evidence that these trade-restricting measures induce firms to contract
total sales by narrowing their product range and skewing sales further towards their
best-performing products. More importantly, firms that were hit with antidumping
measures experience more intense product churning. This finding suggests that Chinese
firms might have the necessary flexibility to adjust their product mix to achieve an
efficient allocation of recourses, in response to the negative antidumping shocks.
4.1 Introduction
Over the past few decades, we have experienced an unprecedented reductions in tariffs
and a substantial lowering of other trade barriers. These policy changes have enabled us
to observe how trade liberalization affect the behavior of individual firms. While studies
in this area are mainly concentrated on liberalization, comparatively little research
investigates how temporary trade barriers, such as antidumping, affect firms’ export
behavior. How firms’ export decision and value shipped are influenced? Do firms
frequently adjust the product scope? In particular, the ways antidumping duties shape
firms’ behavior from the countries named in the measures remain poorly understood.
These are significant omissions since antidumping measures are obstacles to trade which
increase the export costs, and hence inevitably affect the export behavior of firms from
the named countries. I seek to fill these gaps in this paper.
To this end, I estimate how US antidumping measures affect the adjustments of
multi-product Chinese firms. In particular, I focus on the pattern of reallocation across
88
products within firms along the extensive margin of product adding and dropping, as
well as along the intensive margin of changes in sales level and concentration among sur-
viving products. The emphasis on multi-product firms is crucial because they dominate
production and trade flows. Moreover, trade shocks that are exogenous to individual
firms can be identified much more easily than at a higher level of aggregation, since
reallocations are much easier to happen across product lines within firms than across
firms. The analysis of how Chinese firms react sheds new light on the contribution of
firms and products selection into the export market, to overall adjustment in firm-level
exports.
The motivation for focusing on China is threefold. First, China has been the most
targeted country of antidumping investigations initiated by the US. With a total of 549
investigations carried out by the US between 1995 and 2015, China has been the target
of 127 cases. Secondly, the extent of the coverage of the US antidumping measures on
China is considerable. Roughly 7 percent ($35 billion) of Chinese exports to the US
were subject to antidumping duties in 2015. Thirdly, the availability of firm-product
level data over 2000-06 on both product entry and exit makes China a particularly
relevant country for product churning analysis. Finally, the US antidumping measures
against China have all taken the form of ad-valorem tariff, resulting in substantial
duties for a narrow set of products. They are similar to traditional product-level im-
port tariffs, but are only in force for five years. That is, antidumping measures can
be considered temporary, whereas traditional tariffs have a more permanent nature.
The temporariness of antidumping measures allows me to precisely estimate their con-
sequences on firms, as they trigger much less industry dynamics, compared to more
permanent trade liberalization.
I employ the difference-in-difference (DID) approach to identify the effects of US
antidumping measures on firm-level export. Specifically, my identification strategy is
based on the comparison of export decisions (e.g. whether or not to export, how much
to export, et cetera) for firms that were subject to the US antidumping duties (referred
to punished firms), compared to firms that were investigated but did not face any
duties (referred to investigated firms). Notably, both treatment and control groups of
firms have been involved in the antidumping investigations. This alleviates the concern
that firms that were investigated for antidumping may have different characteristics to
those that do not.
Several interesting findings emerge from my analysis. I first document that the
imposition of the US antidumping measures weakly increases firms’ likelihood of ex-
porting. This supports the conclusion of hysteresis in export activity, i.e., once a firm
has paid the sunk costs of exporting, it remains being an exporter (Baldwin, 1988,
1989; Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Bernard and Jensen, 2004). Moreover, I find that
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firm-level exports decrease by 7.5 percent, as antidumping measures increase the vari-
able export costs. I further decompose the export flows into extensive and intensive
margins. Specifically, at the level of the firm, the extensive margin is the number of
exported varieties, while the intensive margin is the average sales per product. Across
firms, I find that the US antidumping duties reduce the range of exported varieties by
1.58 units, while their adverse effects on revenue per product are negligible. That is,
most adjustment appears to come from the extensive margin. Within firms, I find that
the trade-restricting measures induce the distribution of exports across products to be
further skewed towards their best-performing products that survive.
A novel contribution of this paper is I consider within-firm reallocation effects. That
is, I evaluate how product flows, measured by the counts of varieties added and dropped
within firms, are affected by antidumping measures. I find that firms that were subject
to these restrictions are more frequently adding and dropping products, relative to
their counterparts. In particular, punished firms shed more products than they add,
suggesting that antidumping shocks work as a force of creative destruction that leads
to reshuffling across products. To put it differently, antidumping measures spur firms
to rationalize their export behavior and this rationalization translates into more intense
product churning. These results complement evidence in the prior empirical literature
on the importance of firm and product churning in exporting (Baldwin and Gu, 2009;
Arkolakis and Muendler, 2010). They also speak to the relevance of theoretical models
of intra-firm product turnover (Feenstra and Ma, 2008; Eckel and Neary, 2010; Bernard
et al., 2011; Mayer et al., 2014).
My paper is related to the growing literature on the internal allocation of resources
within firms, in response to trade shocks. For example, Bernard et al. (2010), Goldberg
et al. (2010a,b) and Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) show that the declines in trades
costs induce multi-product firms to increase the product scope they exported and
concentrate exports on their core products. In contrast to these research studies on
trade liberalization, I examine how a temporary increase in trade costs affects within-
firm product portfolio adjustments. The increased level of products adjustment found
in this paper indicates that the reshuffling across products plays an important channel
in the resource reallocation caused by changes in trade policy.
My work also sheds light on the impact of antidumping measures on targeted ex-
porters. Lu et al. (2013) use transaction-level Chinese customs data and find that
antidumping measures severely distort trade volume from China to the US. The sub-
stantial negative effect is mainly driven by the sharp decrease in the number of ex-
porters. Chandra and Long (2013) use detailed Chinese firm-level data and reveal that
the US antidumping measures decrease both the labor productivity and total factor
productivity of the targeted Chinese firms. Brambilla et al. (2012) take one step beyond
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standard firm-level analysis and document how individual household (i.e., producer) in
Vietnam respond to the US antidumping duties. None of these papers, however, have
systematically studied the overall effect of antidumping measures on the export scale
and scope (i.e., intensive margin and intra-firm extensive margin) of firms as I do in
this paper.
These findings are informative to policymakers, as they are crucial for designing
appropriate policy interventions. Understanding the dynamics of introducing new va-
rieties and shedding existing ones at the firm level constitutes the first step in under-
standing how exporters adjust their product portfolio to negative trade shocks.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. In Section 2 I describe the data
and document some empirical regularities of multi-product firms in China. In Section
3 I present the estimation strategy, while in Section 4 I provide the empirical findings.
Some concluding remarks follow in Section 5.
4.2 Data
My empirical analysis employs data from two sources: the Temporary Trade Bar-
riers Database (Bown, 2015) and the Chinese customs data between 2000 and 2006.1
The antidumping data come from the Temporary Trade Barriers Database of the
World Bank. This database covers all the antidumping cases by all user countries in
the world, with each investigation mapped to the targeted Harmonized System (HS)
codes from 1980 to 2014. For the US, each antidumping case includes detailed product
information (classified at the 10-digit HS level), the initiation date, the preliminary and
final determination dates, decisions, along with the duty. I focus on all the antidumping
proceedings carried out by the US against China from 2000 to 2006 and aggregate these
products from the 10-digit to the 6-digit HS product level.
Between 2000 and 2006, 147 unique products at the 6-digit HS level from China were
subject to the US antidumping investigations. Among them, 77 products were imposed
antidumping duties (punished products). The rest of 70 products were investigated but
ended up without any antidumping duties (investigated products). Figure 4.1 shows
the annual counts of investigated and punished products. For instance, 28 out of 30
investigated products were subject to the antidumping duties in 2000. Moreover, there
are spikes in certain years due mostly to macroeconomic factors such as China accession
to WTO in 2001, and China removed export license in 2004. These phenomena reveal
the need to control for macroeconomic factors in the empirical specification.
1I thank Nankai University for providing the data.
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Source: Author’s calculation based on the Global Antidumping Database (Bown, 2015).
Figure 4.1: Antidumping Investigations, by Years
Investigations cover a large variety of products in the manufacturing sector. Figure
4.2 documents the 2-digit HS sectors in China that were subject to US antidumping
investigations between 2000 and 2006. It also gives the number of 6-digit HS products
that were investigated by sector and over time. The most frequent targets of the an-
tidumping investigation were products of “Iron and Steel” (Chapter 72) and “Articles
of Iron and Steel” (Chapter 73). Other frequent targets have included products of “pa-
per and paperboard” (Chapter 48), “machinery and stainless steel bearings” (Chapter
84 and 87).
The other component of the data that I use is the Chinese firms’ cross-border
transaction-level data over the 2000-2006 period, obtained from China’s General Ad-
ministration of Customs. These data report the monthly free-on-board value of import
and export transactions by products in US dollars for all Chinese firms with the uni-
versal trading partners.2 I work with annualized exports to avoid the seasonality and
lumpiness typically displayed in monthly data. I also aggregate export products from
the 8-digit to the 6-digit HS level, because China changed the 8-digit HS codes in
2002, and the concordance between the old and the new 8-digit HS codes (before and
after 2002) is not available. Moreover, the HS codes underwent a major revision in
2002; I therefore adopt the 6-digit HS 1996 codes maintained by the World Customs
Organization and use the conversion table from UN Comtrade to convert the HS 2002
2Specifically, the unit of observation is at the firm-product-destination-monthly level. The product
is recorded at the Chinese 8-digit HS product level with a quantity, a value, and a unit value as the
ratio of the shipment value to quantity. Quantity is measured by one of twelve different units of
measurement (such as kilograms, square meters, et cetera).
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Note: The purple bar represents the number of products that were subject to US antidumping investigations. The light
green bar represents the number of products that were not affected by the investigations within each sector. Source:
Author’s calculation based on the Global Antidumping Database (Bown, 2015).
Figure 4.2: Antidumping Investigations, by Sectors
codes into the HS 1996 codes, to ensure the consistency of the product categorization
over time (2000-2006). This is necessary to correctly assess the dynamics in terms of
the number of products that a firm exports, to avoid misinterpretation of a product
classification changes as an adjustment of firms’ extensive product margin.
Some state-owned enterprises in China are pure export-import agents that do not
engage in manufacturing but act exclusively as intermediaries between domestic pro-
ducers (buyers) and foreign buyers (suppliers). Following standard practice in Ahn
et al. (2011), I identify such wholesalers using keywords in firms’ names and exclude
them from the sample. I then match Chinese transaction-level data with the data of
the US antidumping investigations against China, using the 6-digit HS product infor-
mation. A total number of 22,826 Chinese exporters exporting 5,213 unique 6-digit HS
products spanning 1,229 industries, covering 101 sectors to 231 destinations, experi-
enced the US antidumping investigations. Among them, 15,418 firms were subject to
the US antidumping duties. The rest of 7,409 firms were only involved in the investi-
gations but were not imposed any antidumping duties.
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, it is helpful to document some stylized
facts about the firms that have experienced the US antidumping investigations. I first
point out the relative importance of single- and multi-product exporters among them.
Table 4.1 reports the share of each type of firm in the total number of firms, as well as
their share in total export value in 2006. As indicated in the table, multi-product firms
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dominate: they represent a majority of exporters (88 percent), and they account for
a vast majority of shipments (98 percent). Multi-industry and multi-sector firms are
similarly influential, responsible for 85 and 78 percent of firms but 96 and 92 percent
of export, respectively. The final column reveals that the average multi-product firm
produces 26.7 products, that the average multiple-industry firm’s manufactures in 17.8
industries, and that the average multiple-sector firm is present in 8.1 sectors. Compared
to the results reported by Bernard et al. (2011), Chinese multi-product firms tend to
span more industries and sectors, and they account for a larger share of export than
multi-industry and multi-sector US firms.3 These facts seem to be consistent with
China’s export-led growth policy, which has led to more product diversifications at the
firm level.
Table 4.1: Prevalence of firms producing multiple products, industries and sectors in
2006
Mean product, industries
Type of firm Percent of firms Percent of export or sectors per firm
Single-product 12 2 1
Multiple-product 88 98 26.7
Multiple-industry 85 96 17.8
Multiple-sector 78 92 8.1
Note: The table categorizes firms according to whether they produce multiple products (6-digit HS
product categories), industries (4-digit HS product categories), or sectors (2-digit HS product categories).
Columns 1 and 2 summarize the distribution of firms and export, respectively. The final column reports
the mean number of products, industries and sectors across firms exporting more than one of each.
Secondly, the model in Bernard et al. (2011) predicts that firms possess “core com-
petencies”, so that the distribution of a firm’s export sales should be highly skewed
towards its best performing product, i.e., a firm has its particular expertise. I also
find the similar pattern that Chinese firms maintain a core competent product, with
export inside the firm unevenly distributed across products. Table 4.2 reports the av-
erage share of firm export represented by each firm’s products, with products sorted
from the largest to smallest. As shown in the table, the distribution of export across
products is highly skewed, with the average share of firm exports attributable to the
firm’s largest product, ranging from 87 percent for firms that export two products to
57 percent for firms that export 11-25 products. These results are also in line with
what is reported by Bernard et al. (2011) for the US and Goldberg et al. (2010b) for
India, and confirm the notion of “superstar” products, where a small club of products
within a firm accounts for a vast majority of exports.
3Bernard et al. (2011) reports that 39 percent of US exporters are multi-product and account
for 87 percent of total output. Among them, 28 percent and 10 percent of US firms span multiple
industries and sectors and account for 81 percent and 66 percent of output, respectively.
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Table 4.2: Mean Distribution of Within-firm Export Share, 2000 to 2006
Number of products produced by the firm
Rank 1 2 3 4-10 11-25 26-50 51-100 100+
1 1.000 0.869 0.802 0.697 0.561 0.429 0.299 0.183
2 0.130 0.159 0.182 0.188 0.171 0.137 0.094
3 0.038 0.069 0.092 0.097 0.086 0.065
4 0.015 0.021 0.031 0.037 0.033
5 0.002 0.005 0.010 0.012
6 0.001 0.002 0.005
7 0 0.002
8 0
Note: The columns indicate the number of products exported by the firm.
Rows indicate the share of the products in firm export, in declining order of
size. Each cell is the average across the relevant set of firm-product in the
sample. Total number of observations: 2,169,228 (at the firm-product-yearly
level).
I next examine the importance of changes in firms’ product margin over time. I
begin by showing the average number of exported products per firm. The figures in
Table 4.3 show remarkable stability in the average number of exported products at the
firm level, though this average hides rich heterogeneity across firms. For instance, firms
that were subject to the US antidumping duties export roughly 30 products, whereas
firms that were investigated but did not face any antidumping duties export on average
10 products. But, the stable pattern still holds for both types of firms.
Table 4.3: The Number of Firms and Products
The average number of varieties exported by
Year # of exporters # of products All firms Punished firms Investigated firms
2000 8,522 187,977 22.0 27.2 9.5
2001 10,035 231,262 23.0 29.0 8.4
2002 11,631 296,787 25.5 32.3 9.0
2003 13,565 350,072 25.8 32.5 9.7
2004 15,231 396,270 26.0 30.7 11.1
2005 15,605 382,380 24.5 30.7 11.0
2006 18,310 456,041 24.9 31.2 12.0
Source: Author’s own calculations.
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To shed light on the magnitude of product adding and dropping activities within
firms, I divide firms into four mutually exclusive groups based on the manner in which
they alter their product mix. Possible actions are: (1) None - the firm does not add
or drop its products between years t− 1 and t, i.e., no change in the product mix; (2)
Drop - the firm only drops products between years t− 1 and t; (3) Add - the firm only
adds products between years t− 1 and t; and (4) Both - the firm both adds and drops
products between years t− 1 and t, i.e., “churns” products.
Note: Exiting firms are included among those dropping export products.
Figure 4.3: Variety churning at the firm level
As depicted in Figure 4.3 and Table 4.3, many firms introduce new varieties, drop
the existing ones or do both simultaneously. Each year about 1500 to 2000 firms either
introduce a new export variety or drop an existing one. A much larger number, 4500 to
9000 firms simultaneously engage in both activities. In other words, there are intense
churning activities at the product level, within firms.
The frequency and pervasiveness of product switching activities within firms are
further reinforced by the findings in Table 4.4. As indicated in panel A, an average
of 91 percent of surviving firms alter their mix of products every year, 12 percent
by dropping at least one product, 15 percent by adding at least one product. In
panel B of the table, I report export value weighted results, which reveal that a vast
majority of manufacturing export (97.7 percent) is produced by firms that change
their product mix every year. Firms both adding and dropping products account for
the most significant share of export, at 87 percent. Overall, these stylized facts suggest
that product additions and shedding are pervasive, frequent and widespread in China.
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Table 4.4: Annual Product Adding and Dropping, average 2000-2006
All Investigated Punished
Firm activity firms firms firms
Panel A. Percent of firms
None 9 11 8
Drop products only 12 13 11
Add products only 15 18 14
Both add and drop 64 57 67
Panel B. Export value weighted percent of firms
None 2.3 5.5 1.6
Drop products only 3.3 5.4 2.9
Add products only 7.4 12.4 6.4
Both add and drop 87 76.7 89
Note: Panel A displays the annual average share of Chinese firms engaging in each type of product-
changing activities from 2000 to 2006. Panel B provides a similar breakdown but weighting each
firm by its export value. Products refer to the 6-digit HS categories. The four firm activities are
mutually exclusive.
Figure 4.4 displays a simple histogram of the distribution of the number of products.
It reveals that approximately 50 percent export less than six products, 25 percent
export less than 14 products, with the rest of 25 percent exporting 15 products or
more.
Figure 4.4: Histogram of the number of products
97
4.3 Empirical Framework
The objective of this paper is to shed light on how firms reshuffle their export
activity across products in response to the US antidumping measures. To do so, I
first estimate the consequences of these trade-restricting measures along the intensive
margin of trade (i.e., export value by a firm), as well as several extensive margins,
including the number of exported varieties and export participation at the firm level.
The standard theoretical frameworks of heterogeneous-firm model predict that trade
liberalization increases firm-level export. Following this rationale, rising in export costs
is clearly detrimental for firm-level exports. However, their impact on the extensive
margin of trade is ambiguous (i.e., firm-level export participation). Firms may reduce
their probability of exporting to the destination imposing the antidumping measures,
while raising their export participation to other markets. I then highlight the channels
of within-firm product adjustments induced by these shocks. I pursue a difference-in-
difference (DID) methodology which compares firms’ outcomes before and during the
imposition of the US antidumping measures.
Figure 4.5: Product structure of multi-product firms
Figure 4.5 illustrates the multi-product firms in my analysis. The treatment group
is defined as the punished firms that export multiple 6-digit HS products both to the
US and the Rest of the World (RoW), with at least one of their product exporting
to the US was subject to an US antidumping duty. By contrast, the control group
consists of the investigated firms exporting a set of 6-digit products that did not face
any antidumping duty, anywhere in the world. However, one of the product they
export to the US was subject to an US antidumping investigation, but did not result in
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any measure. By limiting the control group to firms whose investigations were ended
without any measures, I control for the selection bias which arises if firms targeted by
the investigations are different from those that do not. Consequently, both treatment
and control groups are identical otherwise, and the concerns about sample selection
is minimized. More importantly, I control for the investigation effect as both groups
are all investigated. The previous literature (Staiger and Wolak, 1994; Besedeš and
Prusa, 2017) have shown that investigation can already negatively impact trade, and
therefore my estimate is likely to yield a smaller effect than the true one. Specifically,
I examine the export patterns of the punished versus the investigated firms by the
following specification
yft = αf + αt + βAD-Effectft + εft, (4.3.1)
where the subscripts f and t denote respectively for firm and year.
The dependent variables are described as follows. I first define a dummy variable
that equals 1 if firm f has positive trade flows in year t and 0 otherwise, to capture the
firm-level export participation.4 This allows me to identify whether the imposition of
the US antidumping measures affects firms’ likelihood of exporting. I next use the log
of real export turnover of firm f in year t as the dependent variable to measure how
increases export costs impact export flows.5 I further decompose firms’ value shipped
into the number of exported varieties and the average sales per products, to quantify
the contribution of within-firm product extensive margin to the overall change in the
value of firms’ exports.
Moreover, I use “entropy” to measure of product diversification. The “entropy”
is defined as
∑
k sfkt ln(sfkt), where sfkt represents the share of a firm’s export value
accounted for the 6-digit HS product k. It captures the extent to which a firm’s
export is skewed toward its largest rather than its smallest products. I also com-
pute the “entropy” of all other products within a firm (excluding the punished ones),∑
k 6=j sfkt ln(sfkt), where j indicates the punished products. The “entropy” with the
exclusion the punished products allows me to capture the general skewness of the entire
product sales distribution that is not affected by the measures.
Further, I assess the relative importance of product switching as a new dimension
of resource reallocation that complements firm entry or exit. To do so, I introduce the
following two variables. I define addft as the sum of the new export varieties of firm
f introduced in year t which did not export in year t− 1. Likewise, I define dropft as
the sum of the varieties of firm f ceasing to be exported in year t that were exported
in year t− 1. These two variables not only measure true product turnover, that is, the
4If it equals to 0, it means that a firm has no export in year t.
5I only include positive values.
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count of products exiting and entering within firms, but also capture the role of firms’
product margin in adjustment to trade shocks.
The AD-Effectft is a dummy that takes a value of 0 for the years before the US
antidumping measures and 1 in the years during the antidumping measures but only for
the punished firms. Firm fixed effects, αf , capture the all time-invariant unobservable
characteristics that might affect firms’ export performance. Year fixed effects, αt,
control for common macro shocks and business cycle effects that may affect all firms;
and εft is a stochastic error. I cluster the standard error at the firm-level to control
for the serial correlation within a firm across years.
Each firm in the treatment group is assigned a date of treatment and an ad-valorem
duty, which comes from the results of the antidumping measures associated with the
product it exports.6 If a firm has more than one product that is subject to an an-
tidumping duty, the treatment date is the one related to the product that accounts for
the highest share of its shipment.7
4.4 Empirical Results
Before turning to the estimates of Equation (4.3.1), Figure 4.6 provides the sugges-
tive evidence that antidumping measures affect the product turnover. Specifically, it
shows the time path of the number of exported products for punished and investigated
firms at yearly intervals spanning from six years prior to six years after the investi-
gations. The vertical line marks the date of imposition of preliminary duties. While
there is a drop in the product scope for punished firms after the measures, there is no
visible change in the trend of product scope for investigated firms.
Table 4.5 reports the results of how changes in trade policy in the US affect the
export behavior of Chinese firms. In column (1), I find that the imposition of an-
tidumping measures on firms marginally increases their likelihood of exporting by 0.5
percentage points. This result may seem odd, but it can be explained by hysteresis
in export activity: exporters who have already paid the fixed entry costs to export
may “hang in” there via exploring new trading relationships, since the duration of
the antidumping measures is in principle limited to 5 years. Moreover, the previous
finding (Lu et al., 2013) that antidumping measures have resulted in a sharp decline
in the number of exporters should be interpreted as the firm-product-destination level
6The treatment year is defined as the year in which the preliminary antidumping duties were
imposed for the punished firms.
7However, it is possible that firms may learn to adjust their export activities following their first
experience of the antidumping measure. I therefore define the treatment year as the preliminary
decision date of the earliest antidumping measure to the firm as a robustness check. The results are
quantitatively similar.
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Figure 4.6: Time trend of number of exported products
reduction, not at the firm level. Firms that were hit with the antidumping shocks may
stop exporting the specific-product to the policy-imposing market (e.g. US), but these
constraints do not restrict their overall ability to export.
I now turn to analyze whether the US antidumping measures have depressed Chinese
firms’ export flows. From column (2) we note that the imposition of such duties results
in a sizable decrease in export turnover of about 7.5 percent on average.8 Moreover,
these measures are associated with a negative effect on firms’ product range, as is shown
in column (3). Specifically, Chinese firms that were exposed to the US trade restrictions
reduce their number of the exported products by almost 1.6 units.9 There is also a
decline in average exports per product within firms, though is not significant. The
lack of relationship between export product sales and antidumping measures suggest
that the trade destruction effect on firms’ export is almost entirely driven by the
extensive margin: the decrease in the number of exported products. Increasing trade
costs translate into lower export through a decline in the number of exported varieties,
however, it does not affect average shipment per product within a firm.
I next consider how firms adjust their distribution of sales across products to the
antidumping shocks, using “entropy”. Specifically, column (5) reveals that firms that
were faced with the US antidumping measures exhibit rises in entropy. This conclusion
8The exact percentage difference in the predicted y when Dp,t = 1 versus when Dp,t = 0 is
%4y = 100× (eβ − 1).
9Taking the log of this variable yields similar result, the punished firms have experienced a sizable
4.6 percent reduction in product range after the shocks (t = −3.62), which contribute to 0.046/0.075 =
61.3 percent of the firms’ export value losses.
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is further bolstered by the results in column (6), where I use the entropy measurements
with the exclusion of punished products. In particular, rather than a marginally sig-
nificant increase in entropy, firms that were subject to the US antidumping measures
exhibit noticeably, 4.3 percent rises. These findings indicate that the export sales of
punished firms are further concentrated toward the largest, rather than the smallest
products that are not targeted by the trade-restricting measures after the shocks.
Overall, these results provide show that the US antidumping measures induce Chi-
nese firms to contract total export sales by narrowing their product range and skewing
sales further towards the top infra-marginal products. However, the extensive margin
of trade dominates.
I then discuss how product flows, i.e., the count of products entering and exiting the
market within firms, are affected by these measures. This analysis links how increases in
export costs contribute to within-firm product selection into the export markets. Prior
to estimating their impact, I tabulate in the appendix (Table 4.6) benchmark estimates
of the firm-level relationship between product creation, destruction and product scope.
I find that the product-flow measures capture a substantial share of variations in the
product mix within firms: 1 percentage point of product creations increases the product
scope by almost 10 percent, and 1 percentage point of product destruction reduces the
product range by 4.3 percent.
Columns (7) and (8) present the estimates for product adding and dropping within
firms. The estimated results show that Chinese firms that were subject to the US
antidumping measures experience more intense product churning activities. In partic-
ular, they on average add roughly 0.8 products more as well as drop 2.5 varieties more.
The combined effect of the extensive margins, seen by adding the coefficients across
columns (7)-(8) almost complete explains the firm-level variation in product scope.
More importantly, firms drop more products than they add, suggesting that firms ra-
tionalize their shedding activities as antidumping measures are product-specific shocks.
This finding might also reflect that Chinese firms have the flexibility to reshuffle their
product mix in response to the policy changes.
Summing up Table 4.5, I find that the US antidumping measures have a consider-
able negative impact on firm-level export, which is mostly caused by the decrease in the
number of exported products, while it is uncorrelated to the average export per firm.
Further, the adverse antidumping shocks induce Chinese firms to skew the export sales
towards their best performing product. More importantly, the discontinuation of prod-
uct lines contributes to the net product margin, suggesting that “creative destruction”
along the product dimension. That is, firms restrict their product range in response to
the negative trade shocks; product destruction outweighs product addition along the
product extensive margin within firms. To this end, we connect the changes in firms’
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product mix to changes in trade policy.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper adds to the literature on trade policy and how that affects multi-product
firms from the perspective of a large developing country. I show that the US antidump-
ing measures reduce the export flows of Chinese firms by 7.5 percent. Decomposing
the firm level exports into the extensive and intensive margins, I find that firms adjust
to a rise in trade costs via narrowing the portfolio of exported products (intra-firm ex-
tensive margin). However, there is no impact on the average sales per product within
a firm. That is, the extensive margin dominants. I also find that multi-product firms
tend to further skew their sales toward their best-performing products. These results
imply that rising in variable trade costs (i.e., increase in tariff) combined with the
presence of core competence pattern leads to an adjustment in the range of products
exported at the firm level.
I then provide evidence that variety churning within the firms is another important
margin of adjustment taking place, in response to the antidumping shocks. I document
that punished firms experience more intense product churning, as they speed up the
process of both the introduction and discontinuation of export products, relative to
their counterparts. My analysis therefore highlights the role of selection across products
within firms matters for transmission of external shocks. A deeper understanding of
the role of the extensive and intensive margins of trade can help, for example, to shed
light on mechanisms through which trade costs affect trade flows and the channels of
antidumping measures affect the allocation of resources within firms.
These results are essential in understanding the effect of antidumping measures on
exporters. Fruitful avenues for future research include seeing what types of products
firms tend to add and drop. It is the first step in understanding whether antidumping
measures from the US induce Chinese firms to adjust their product quality. It is
also important to know how exporters adjust their export activity differently across
markets, as the product-level antidumping shock is market-specific which increases the
export cost to the policy-implementing country. This exercise will inform how a cost
shock in one market impacts firms’ product portfolio in other markets, i.e., how firms’
export behavior are linked across markets, which will deliver significant implications
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4.6 Appendix
Table 4.6: Relationship between product adding and dropping and product scope
within firms










Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 91937 91937 91937
Adjusted R2 0.815 0.773 0.780
Note: Product creation as the number of new varieties introduced in year t divided by the total number of varieties exported
by firm f in year t. Likewise, product destruction as the number of products ceasing to be exported in year t divided by the
total number of varieties exported by firm f in year t. I refer to the sum of the two as gross churning and to the difference
as net churning.
Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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